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Abstract
This paper presents a soundness and completeness proof for propositional intuitionistic calculus with respect to the semantics of
computability logic. The latter interprets formulas as interactive computational problems, formalized as games between a machine
and its environment. Intuitionistic implication is understood as algorithmic reduction in the weakest possible — and hence most
natural — sense, disjunction and conjunction as deterministic-choice combinations of problems (disjunction = machine’s choice,
conjunction = environment’s choice), and “absurd” as a computational problem of universal strength.
c© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Computability logic (CL), introduced in [6], is a framework and program for redeveloping logic as a formal
theory of computability, as opposed to the formal theory of truth which it has more traditionally been. Unlike
many nonclassical visions, the most notable examples being intuitionistic and linear logics, CL is not a syntactically
conceived approach. Rather, it was born as a pure semantics, leaving the task of finding corresponding axiomatizations
(syntax) as a challenge for future efforts. While [6] did not prove any axiomatization results, it did take the risk of
stating conjectures regarding the soundness and completeness (adequacy) of certain deductive systems with respect
to the semantics of CL. Among the systems conjectured to adequately axiomatize a fragment of otherwise much more
expressive CL was Heyting’s intuitionistic calculus. The first step toward a positive verification of that conjecture was
made in [14], where the soundness of intuitionistic predicate calculus was proven. The next step forward came in
[13], where the implicative fragment of intuitionsitic calculus was proven to be complete. Generalizing and further
advancing the methods used in [13], the present paper tells a new success story, proving the completeness of the full
propositional intuitionistic calculus Int with respect to the semantics of CL. To reduce the degree of reliance on prior
work, this paper also includes a (or an alternative) soundness proof for Int, the result already known from [14] in a
stronger form.
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The sheer size of the present paper suggests that the CL-adequacy proof for intuitionistic logic is far from trivial.
This may give rise to doubts in the following style. There are already many semantics — Kripke models, algebraic
or topological interpretations, etc. — with respect to which intuitionistic logic has been proven to be adequate.
So why bother studying yet another semantics, with apparently much more complex proofs of the corresponding
adequacy theorems? Furthermore, the CL semantics is in fact a game semantics. Then why not just be happy with,
say, Lorenzen’s [19] game semantics, which has been around since long ago?
CL has the following words in response. If simplicity is most important, why not indeed put aside this paper and
focus on the empty logic with the semantics that falsifies everything. Or if, for some reason, you want to deal with
intuitionistic and only intuitionistic logic, here is an idea: consider the semantics where truth, by definition, means
provability in Heyting’s calculus. You got a one-line-long definition of the whole semantics together with a proof of
adequacy. Or if, for some reason, you want the semantics by all means to be a game semantics, how about this one:
Every formula F is a game between Proponent and Opponent. The first move is by Proponent, consisting in presenting
a tree T of formulas with F at its root and claiming that T is a proof of F . The next move is by Opponent, consisting
in choosing a node G of T and claiming that T has an error at G. Opponent wins if and only if G (indeed) is neither
an axiom nor does it follow from its children by any of the inference rules of Heyting’s calculus. Sure adequacy is
guaranteed: Proponent has a winning strategy for F if and only if F is provable. Or maybe you want something more
“serious”, such as, say, games involving traversing a potential proof tree T for F starting from its root, where, at each
step, depending on what rule is claimed (by Proponent) to justify the node, either Proponent or Opponent chooses
a child? No problem, producing precise definitions and an adequacy proof would probably take not more than ten
minutes and half a page. Or maybe ...
OK, that’s enough. Hopefully the point has been made. It is always possible to come up with some sort of a
“semantics” with respect to which the system under question is sound and complete. And there are no limits to how
simple — or the opposite — both the semantics and the corresponding adequacy proofs can be. But the point is:
what is the point? The term semantics has often been abused in the logical literature, resulting in a depreciation of its
originally noble meaning. What has often been sold as the real thing has in fact been not too far from the parodies
of semantics seen in the previous paragraph. This sort of unfair game has typically been motivated by the desire to
justify, at any cost, one or another popular syntactic construction.
Wrong. According to the credo of CL, it is syntax that should be a faithful servant to a meaningful and motivated
semantics rather than vice versa. This is so because CL sees logic as a tool for “successfully navigating the real world”
[15]. And the true purpose of a semantics — of one with a capital ‘S’ — should be providing a bridge between that
real, outside world and the man-made world of otherwise meaningless symbolic expressions and proofs of formal
logic. Without achieving this goal the semantics, whether technically a game semantics or not, would be nothing but
just a game. Adjusting a semantics to the needs of some beautiful or otherwise appealing syntax, which has been done
so often by so many logicians, would be fine if it was possible to simultaneously make adjustments in that real, outside
world. Unfortunately, however, the real world— at least at the level of abstraction suitable for logic— remains largely
beyond the control of a man.
The semantics of classical logic is the model example of a semantics with a capital ‘S’. Among the semantics for
intuitionistic logic that are on the “capital-S” side one could name the formulas-as-types approach (Curry–Howard
isomorphism) and Artemov’s [1] semantics of proofs, even though, in their general spirits and philosophies, these two
are very different from the approach of CL. The algebraic or Kripke semantics fall under another category, to which
[15] refers as “lowercase ‘s’ semantics”. These are often very useful in analyzing and understanding given syntactic
constructions, but in most cases cannot be treated as independent justifications for those constructions: an attempt to
see more than syntax-serving technical tools in these sorts of semantics, as pointed out in [15], may yield a vicious
circle. The same obviously applies to Lorenzen’s game semantics for intuitionistic logic. To many questions in the
style “but why this and not another way?”, it essentially has no other answer but the circular “because this is necessary
to achieve the adequacy of Heyting’s calculus”. Another serious disadvantage of Lorenzen’s semantics before those
of classical or computability logics is that, while it talks about validity, a concept of truth is inherently absent in it,
signifying that applied theories (say, arithmetic) could not be meaningfully based on that semantics, even if pure logic
could.
Blass’s [2,3] game semantics, which happens to be the closest precursor of the semantics of computability logic,
deserves a special comment. A detailed discussion of what is common and different between the two is given in
Sections 13 and 27 of [6], and we will not elaborate on this topic here. It should be noted that, unlike Lorenzen’s game
G. Japaridze / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 147 (2007) 187–227 189
semantics, there are no artificially tuned elements in Blass’s semantics, to which it owes a great degree of naturalness
and appeal. And, as early as in 1972, the propositional fragment of intuitionistic logic was found to be sound with
respect to it. Unfortunately, no further technical progress has been made in that promising direction, and the questions
on predicate-level soundness or whatever-level completeness have been remaining unanswered since then.
Computability logic is not modest about claiming that it offers a capital-‘S’ semantics in the proper sense. Trying
to convince the reader that there are good reasons for such a claim is outside the scope of the present paper. This
job has been done in [6,10,15]. Below we only give an atrociously brief (by the standards of CL) overview of the
intuitions pertaining to the relevant fragment of CL.
That relevant fragment — let us call it the intuitionistic fragment — is obtained by restricting the otherwise more
expressive (and, in fact, open-ended) formalism of CL to the logical vocabulary { ◦– ,unionsq,u,unionsq,u, $}, with these
six items intended as the readings of the intuitionistic implication, disjunction, conjunction, existential quantifier,
universal quantifier and absurd, respectively. Negation is not formally present as a primitive symbol here, but is rather
understood as an abbreviation defined by
The intuitionistic negation of F = F ◦– $.
The semantics of computability logic is indeed a game semantics. And games in it are indeed not “just games”.
They are seen as formal equivalents of our broadest intuition of computational problems, specifically, computational
problems in their most general — interactive — sense. Computability, or algorithmic solvability, of such problems
is understood as existence of an interactive Turing machine that wins the game no matter how the other player,
which is the environment or the user, behaves. In this vision of logic, computability replaces the classical concept of
truth, operations on games = problems replace Boolean connectives and quantifiers, and the understanding of logical
formulas as (representing) computational problems comes in the place of their classical understanding as true/false
statements, with valid formulas now describing universally correct principles of computability (“always computable”
problems), and the logic as a whole providing a systematic answer to the question on what can be algorithmically
solved and how.
There is a host of the most basic and natural operations on interactive computational problems, and those
represented by the operators of intuitionistic logic are among them. So, computability logic and its intuitionistic
fragment in particular are logics of problems in a direct and proper sense. This reminds us of the well known thesis
set forth by Kolmogorov [18] in 1932, and a number of attempts — of various degrees of success — to materialize it,
such as Kleene’s realizability [16], Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation [5] or Medvedev’s finite-problem semantics [20].
According to Kolmogorov’s thesis, stated at the philosophical level rather than in clear technical terms, intuitionistic
logic is a logic of problems. CL materializes this abstract philosophy by turning it into a precise mathematics, only
for a more expressive formal language than that of intuitionistic logic, with the latter being a modest fragment of the
former.
In what follows we briefly survey the “intuitionistic” operations of computability logic. Among the other operations
officially introduced so far within the framework of CL are negation ¬, parallel connectives ∨, ∧, parallel quantifiers∨,∧, strict reduction →, blind quantifiers ∃,∀, parallel recurrences ∨| , ∧| , branching recurrences ◦| , ◦| . Detailed
intuitive explanations and formal definitions for all these operations, along with the “intuitionistic” ones, can be found
in [15].
The operators u,unionsq,u,unionsq are called choice operators in CL, because they represent (deterministic) choice steps in
the course of interaction between a machine and its environment. The choice disjunction A1unionsq A2 of games A1 and A2
is the game where the first move is by the machine. The move should be ‘1’ or ‘2’, amounting to selecting the left or
the right disjunct. After such a move i ∈ {1, 2} is made, the play continues and the winner is determined according to
the rules of the chosen component Ai . And if the machine simply fails to make any move/choice, then it is considered
to have lost. Choice conjunction A1u A2 is defined in exactly the same way, only with the roles of the machine and the
environment interchanged. That is, the initial move i ∈ {1, 2} in A1u A2 is the environment’s privilege and obligation.
As for choice quantifiers, with {1, 2, 3, . . .} being the universe of discourse, they can be understood as infinite versions
of unionsq and u, defined by
unionsqx A(x) = A(1) unionsq A(2) unionsq A(3) unionsq . . .
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and
ux A(x) = A(1) u A(2) u A(3) u . . .
For instance, where f (x) is a function,uxunionsqy (y = f (x)) is the game in which the first move is by the environment,
consisting in specifying a particular value m for x . Such a move, which intuitively can be seen as asking the machine
the question “what is the value of f (m)?” brings the game down to the position unionsqy (y = f (m)). The next step
is by the machine, who should specify a value n for y, further bringing the game down to n = f (m). The latter is
understood as a moveless position won by the machine if true and lost if false.1 The machine’s move n can thus be
seen as claiming that n is the value of f (m). Now it must be clear thatuxunionsqy (y = f (x)) represents the problem of
computing f , with the machine having an algorithmic winning strategy for this game iff f is a computable function.
Similarly, where S is a set,ux (x ∈ S unionsq x 6∈ S) represents the problem of deciding S: here, again, the first move is by
the environment, consisting in choosing a value m for x (asking “is m an element of S?”); and the next step is by the
machine who, in order to win, should choose the true disjunct of m ∈ S unionsq m 6∈ S, i.e. correctly tell whether m is an
element of S or not.
Next, ◦– is an operation of reducing one problem to another in the weakest possible — and hence most natural
— sense, for which reason [6] calls it weak reduction,2 as opposed to strong (strict, linear) reduction denoted in CL
by the different symbol →. As a reduction operation, ◦– induces — and in certain contexts can be identified with
— a reducibility relation. Specifically, a problem B is weakly reducible to a problem A iff the problem A ◦– B
has an algorithmic solution. Intuitively, A ◦– B is a problem solving which means solving B while having A
as an external computational resource, with an “external computational resource” meaning a to-be-solved-by-the-
environment computational problem. More precisely, in the antecedent the roles of the problem-solving machine and
its environment are interchanged. Acting in the role of an environment there, the machine may observe how the
antecedent is being solved, and utilize this information in its own solving the consequent.
An example might help. Let T be a finitely axiomatized applied theory based on classical first-order logic, such
as, say, Robinson’s arithmetic, and let x range over the formulas of the language of T . Next, let PrT (x) be the
predicate “x is a theorem of T ”, Pr(x) the predicate “x is provable in classical predicate calculus”, and ¬PrT (x)
and ¬Pr(x) the ordinary negations of these predicates. As a decision problem, the T -theoremhood problem would
be expressed byux(PrT (x) unionsq ¬PrT (x)). This is generally undecidable, yet algorithmically reducible to the problemux(Pr(x) unionsq ¬Pr(x)) of provability in predicate calculus. The problem of reducing the former to the latter can then
be expressed by
ux(Pr(x) unionsq ¬Pr(x)) ◦– ux(PrT (x) unionsq ¬PrT (x)). (1)
The duty of a machine solving the above compound problem is to solveux(PrT (x)unionsq¬PrT (x)), i.e. answer any given
question of the type “is F a theorem of T ?” asked by the environment. Yet, the machine is expected to do so only on
the condition that the environment does not fail to correctly solve the similar problem ux(Pr(x) unionsq ¬Pr(x)) in the
antecedent, where the roles are switched and it is the machine who can ask questions like “is H provable in predicate
calculus?”. So, here is an algorithmic strategy for the machine. Wait until the environment asks “is F a theorem of
T ?” for some particular F . Then ask the counterquestion “is Ax → F provable in predicate calculus?”, where Ax is
the conjunction of all nonlogical axioms of T . The environment will have to provide a correct yes/no answer, or else
it loses. Whatever the answer of the environment in the antecedent is, repeat the same answer in the consequent, and
rest your case. The success of this strategy is guaranteed by the deduction theorem for classical logic.
Observe that the above explanation of the meaning of A ◦– B is exactly what the Turing reduction of B to A is all
about. The latter — more precisely, the Turing reducibility of B to A — is defined as existence of a Turing machine
that solves B when having an oracle correctly answering any questions regarding A. We can see such an oracle as
(a part of) the environment solving A for the machine, thus providing an external computational resource. The only
difference is that the resource provided by an oracle is always a simple question-answering type of a task such as the
aboveux(Pr(x)unionsq¬Pr(x)), while the antecedent (as well as the consequent, of course) of a ◦– -implication can have
1 This should not suggest that the atoms of intuitionistic logic are required to be interpreted as moveless games/positions. Rather, they represent
arbitrary interactive computational problems.
2 The symbol used for ◦- in [6] was⇒.
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an arbitrarily complex interaction interface. For instance, (1) is already a problem with a non-standard interface, and
CL, unlike traditional approaches, allows us to meaningfully talk about reducing (1) itself to yet another problem, or
reducing another problem to it. As a reducibility relation, ◦– is thus a conservative generalization of the kind old
textbook concept of Turing reducibility from the traditional, input/output sorts of problems to problems of arbitrary
degrees of interactivity.
A relevant question here is whether the antecedent, as a resource, is allowed to be reused. The answer is yes. Turing
reduction does not impose any limits on how many times the oracle can be queried. Similarly, if our strategy for (1)
had a need to repeatedly ask “is H provable in predicate calculus?” (for various Hs), it would have been able to do
so. This essentially means that multiple copies rather than a single copy of A are played in the antecedent of A ◦– B.
Computability logic, of course, does have a stronger reduction operation which forbids repeated usage of the
antecedent. It is the already mentioned →. Not surprisingly, the logical behavior of → is different from that of ◦– :
informally speaking, the former is (plainly) resource-sensitive while the latter is not. The following two intuitionistic
principles are examples of valid formulas that stop being valid if ◦– is replaced by→:
P u (P ◦– Q) ◦– Q;(
P ◦– (Q ◦– R)) ◦– ((P ◦– Q) ◦– (P ◦– R)).
As for $, it is understood as a computational problem of universal strength, i.e. a problem to which any other
problem of interest is algorithmically reducible. Turing completeness, NP-completeness, etc. are good intuitive
examples of “being of universal strength”. Section 2.3 explains this concept in greater detail.
The present introductory section has been written for a general audience, but the same cannot be said about the
rest of the paper, which is largely meant only for those who are already sufficiently familiar with computability logic,
or are willing to do some parallel reading. Due to the recent dynamic development [6–15], CL has reached the point
where it is no longer feasible or expedient to define (let alone explain and motivate) all over again each of the already
introduced concepts relevant to a given technical paper. This article does rely, both technically and motivationally,
on some prior material. Specifically, the proofs presented here should be read after or in parallel with the relevant
parts of [15], which serves as a source of all special notation, terminology and concepts for the present paper. While
long, [15] is easy to read as it is written in a semitutorial style, without assuming any preliminary knowledge of the
subject. Every unfamiliar term or notation used but not defined in the present paper can and should be looked up in
[15], which has a convenient index of all terms and symbols. Familiarity with or parallel reading of [15] is a necessary
and sufficient condition for understanding the technical parts of this paper.
2. Intuitionistic logic
2.1. Syntax
The language of propositional intuitionistic logic Int has one logical atom $ and infinitely many nonlogical atoms,
for which we use the metavariables P , Q, R, X , Y , Z , T , W , possibly with indices. Its formulas, that will be referred
to as Int-formulas, are built from atoms and the binary operators ◦– , unionsq, u in the standard way. We will be using
the letters E, F,G, H, K 3 (possibly with indices) as metavariables for formulas, and underlined letters such as G as
metavariables for finite sequences of formulas. The meaning of an expression such as G, F, H should be clear: this is
the result of appending F to G, and then appending H to the resulting sequence.
An Int-sequent is a pair G ⇒ E , where G, called the antecedent, is any finite sequence of Int-formulas, and E ,
called the succedent, is a (one single) Int-formula.
Below is a Gentzen-style axiomatization of Int. A formula K is considered provable in it iff the empty-antecedent
sequent⇒ K is provable. We will be writing Int ` for provability in Int.
The axioms of Int are all Int-sequents of the form
K ⇒ K or $ ⇒ K ,
and the rules of inference, with i ranging over {1, 2}, are given by the following schemata:
3 And sometimes some other capital letters as well, such as A, B,C, D, I .
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G, E, F, H ⇒ K
Exchange
G, F, E, H ⇒ K
G ⇒ K
Weakening
G, E ⇒ K
G, E, E ⇒ K
Contraction
G, E ⇒ K
G, E ⇒ K
Right ◦–
G ⇒ E ◦– K
G, E ⇒ K1 H ⇒ K2
Left ◦–
G, H , K2 ◦– E ⇒ K1
G ⇒ Ki
Right unionsq
G ⇒ K1 unionsq K2
G, E1 ⇒ K G, E2 ⇒ K
Left unionsq
G, E1 unionsq E2 ⇒ K
G ⇒ K1 G ⇒ K2
Right u
G ⇒ K1 u K2
G, Ei ⇒ K
Left u
G, E1 u E2 ⇒ K
2.2. Kripke semantics
A Kripke model [17] — or simply a model— is a triple K = (W,R, |≡ ), where:
• W (here) is the set {1, . . . , n} of the first n ≥ 1 positive integers, called the worlds of K. 1 is said to be the root of
K, and n is said to be the size of K.
• R, called the accessibility relation, is a transitive, reflexive and antisymmetric relation between worlds, such that,
for all p, q1, q2 ∈W , the following conditions are satisfied:
– 1Rp;
– whenever q1Rp and q2Rp, we have q1Rq2 or q2Rq1.
In other words, (W,R) forms a tree with 1 at its root. When pRq, we say that q is accessible (in K) from p.
• |≡ , called the forcing relation ofK, is a relation between worlds and Int-formulas, for all p ∈W and all formulas
E, F satisfying the following conditions:
– if p |≡ E and pRq , then q |≡ E ;
– p /|≡ $;
– p |≡ E unionsq F iff p |≡ E or p |≡ F (or both);
– p |≡ E u F iff p |≡ E and p |≡ F ;
– p |≡ E ◦– F iff, for every world q accessible from p, if q |≡ E , then q |≡ F .
Where G is a sequence of formulas, we write p |≡ G to mean that p |≡ G for every formula G of G. The relation
|≡ further extends to sequents by stipulating that p |≡ G ⇒ E iff, for every world q accessible from p, if q |≡ G,
then q |≡ E . We read p |≡ ς (whatever ς is) as “p forces ς (in K)”.
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LetK = (W,R, |≡ ) be a model. Where F is an Int-formula, or a sequence of Int-formulas, or an Int-sequent, we
writeK ||≡F to mean that 1 |≡F . Note that this immediately implies that p |≡F for all p ∈W . And we say that an Int-
formula E is K-equivalent to an Int-formula F — symbolically K ||≡ E ◦–◦ F — iff K ||≡ E ◦– F and K ||≡ F ◦– E .
Obviously K ||≡ E ◦–◦ F means that, for each world p of K, p |≡ E iff p |≡ F , so that “K does not see any difference
between E and F”. Next, we will write simply ||≡F or ||≡ E ◦–◦ F to mean that K ||≡F or K ||≡ E ◦–◦ F for every
Kripke model K. The symbols /|≡ and /||≡ , as expected, will be used for the negations of |≡ and ||≡ , respectively.
The following lemma is obvious:
Lemma 2.1. Assume K is a Kripke model, and E1, E2,G1,G2 are Int-formulas such that:
• E2 is the result of replacing in E1 some occurrence(s) of G1 by G2;
• K ||≡ G1 ◦–◦ G2.
Then K ||≡ E1 ◦–◦ E2.
The following well known [17] fact will play an important role in our proof of the completeness of Int with respect
to the semantics of computability logic. We will be referring to it as the soundness and completeness of Int with
respect to Kripke semantics:
Fact 2.2. An Int-sequent or Int-formula S is provable in Int if (completeness) and only if (soundness) ||≡ S.
2.3. Computability-logic semantics
If the logical vocabulary of Int did not include $, this subsection would be redundant, as the reader is assumed
to be already familiar, from Sections 7 and 8 of [15], with the CL semantics for a much more expressive language.
However, $ was not officially present in that language, so we need to clarify how the semantics of CL extends to the
$-containing formalism of Int. As a logical constant, $ was introduced in the very first paper [6] on computability
logic, but since it has been promised that [15] would be the only external source on which the present paper relies,
here we reproduce all necessary definitions and some discussions from [6] pertaining to how $ is treated in CL.
To understand the intuitions underlying our interpretation of $, let us, for a moment, imagine classical logic with its
⊥written as $, and¬E understood as an abbreviation of E → $. How could one characterize $ in philosophical terms?
The standard answer here is that $ is an always false formula. Yet, there would be nothing in an axiomatization of the
above version of classical logic directly implying that $ cannot be true. Indeed, the (essentially) only postulated or
derived scheme characterizing $ would be $ → E for all formulas E . If, however, every nonlogical atom is interpreted
as a true proposition, then $ → E remains true even when $ is true. Thus, a more general characterization of $ would
be that it represents a “strongest” — rather than necessarily false — proposition, i.e. a proposition that implies every
other proposition expressible in the language. Still, interpretations where all atoms and hence all formulas are true
would be rather pathological in the context of classical logic, and hardly of any interest. Indeed, when everything we
can say is true, there is no need for a logic at all. So, the standard interpretation of $ as ⊥ (“always false formula”) in
classical logic is a natural choice essentially yielding no loss of generality even under the cautious philosophical vision
‘$ = strongest proposition’. For, as long as there is at least one false statement expressible in the language— and in all
reasonable applications there indeed would be such statements — being a strongest proposition automatically means
being false, i.e. being ⊥.
Things are quite different in computability logic though. It is more general than classical logic, and one should
expect that $, as a “strongest formula”, would also naturally call for a more general or liberal interpretation than
classical logic does. In computability logic, as we know, formulas stand for computational problems rather than just
true/false statements, and |H A → B means that B is (algorithmically) reducible to A rather than just that B is
“implied” by A. So, $ here becomes a “strongest problem”, i.e. a problem to which every other problem of interest
is reducible. Let us call such a problem a universal problem. Sure ⊥ is one — the simplest — sort of a universal
problem: everything is trivially reducible to it. But ⊥ is a very special sort of a universal problem, and by far not
the only meaningful interpretation for $. What makes ⊥ special is that it is an elementary problem, while all other
atoms of Int generally represent problems of arbitrary degrees of interactivity — static games of arbitrary depths, that
is. Insisting on interpreting $ as an elementary problem (or anything equivalent to such) while all other atoms and
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hence all other formulas represent not-necessarily-elementary problems might create a hybrid that possibly gives rise
to some logical anomalies.
Another feature that makes ⊥ less than general enough as the only legitimate logical representative of universal
problems is that ⊥ is what [6] (Section 18) calls negative, while two other equally meaningful possibilities for a
universal problem are to be positive or indetermined. Informally speaking, a positive problem is one that has a solution
yet not necessarily an algorithmic one; a negative problem is one whose negation is positive; and an indetermined
problem is one that is neither positive nor negative.4 Let us set aside indeterminism and focus on positiveness, here
seeing it as a computability-logic counterpart of classical truth. As noted earlier, in the context of classical logic,
dealing with an interpretation of the language that makes all formulas true/positive would be less than interesting. The
same, however, is far from being the case for computability-logic-based applied languages. Considering languages
— more precisely, interpretations — that only allow us to express positive problems does make perfect sense, and
in no way does it generally make logic worthless or trivial. For example, note that the standard computability
or complexity theories are exclusively concerned with positive problems. In fact, positiveness is inherent to the
traditional, narrow understanding of the term “problem”: in that understanding, a problem usually means a game
of the form ux(A(x) unionsq ¬A(x)) or uxunionsqy(y = f (x)), where A is a predicate and f is a function. Such problems
are automatically positive: they do have solutions, even though not always algorithmic or efficient ones. If, say, CL
was used to formalize a fragment of computability theory that is focused on recursively enumerable problems (in our
terms, games of the form ux(A(x) unionsq ¬A(x)) where A is a recursively enumerable predicate), with the nonlogical
general atoms thus ranging over such problems, then one of the interesting — more so than ⊥— interpretations of $
would be understanding it as the acceptance problem for the universal Turing machine (UTM). Intuitively, the reason
why this positive problem is universal is that, if I know what inputs UTM accepts and what inputs it does not accept,
then, for any recursively enumerable predicate A(x) and any particular value m for x , I can effectively tell whether
A(m) is true or false. Going a little bit beyond the present scope of computability logic and imagining that→ means
polynomial-time reduction (in a yet-to-be defined precise sense), if one is exclusively concerned with problems from
the class NP, then a natural candidate for a universal problem $ would be the 3-satisfiability or any other NP-complete
problem— or, for safety, let us say some polynomially-bounded version of the branching or parallel recurrence of such
a problem. Then |H E → $ would mean that E (too) is NP-complete, rather than that E is a “false” or “unsolvable
even by God” problem, i.e. that E is a problem which the traditional complexity theory would not really consider
meaningful and legitimate.
To summarize, our approach, for adopting which there are good reasons, is to interpret $ as a universal problem,
i.e. a problem of universal strength, i.e. a problem to which all other problems are reducible (in the sense of Section
6 of [15]). This approach insists on making no additional assumptions regarding $ as a universal problem, such as its
being elementary, or negative, or non-positive, etc.
Of course, the above is only a philosophical characterization, and what, exactly, a universal problem means is yet
to be formally defined. First of all, the range of “all” in “all other problems” should be specified. Otherwise, ⊥ would
always be among “other problems”, which would make ⊥ (modulo equivalence) the only possible candidate for a
universal problem. That is, the concept of universal problem is relative — relative to a set of problems, called the
problem universe, that are considered the only “legitimate”, or “of interest” problems within a given treatment. We
reasonably require any problem universe to be countable, and come in the form of a fixed list of its elements rather
than just as the set of those elements. For simplicity we also require that such a list be infinite. There is no loss of
generality here, because any finite list can be painlessly extended to an “essentially the same” yet formally infinite list
by replicating its last element infinitely many times. Here comes the formal definition:
Definition 2.3. A problem universe is an infinite sequence U = 〈A1, A2, A3, . . .〉 of static games. A universal
problem of such a U is any static game B satisfying the following conditions:
1. For each i ≥ 1, Ai is reducible (in the sense of Section 6 of [15]) to B and,
2. furthermore, there is an effective procedure that, for each i ≥ 1, constructs a reduction (in the sense of Section 6
of [15]) of Ai to B.
4 Yes, indetermined problems do exists, although, according to Theorem 18.7 of [6], not among perifinite-depth ones.
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As noted, the intuition behind the concept of universal problem B is that this is a problem of universal strength:
having it as a computational resource means being able to solve any of the problems of the universe, as every problem
of the universe is algorithmically reducible to B. However, just existence of those algorithmic reductions would have
little value if there was no way to find them. The ‘furthermore’ clause of the above definition guarantees that reduction
strategies not only exist, but can be effectively found. Of course, when the problem universe is “essentially finite”,
that clause is redundant.
There are many potential problem universes, and the next question to clarify is which one should be considered
the problem universe U in any given case, i.e. in any particular application of Int or CL in general. In precise terms,
a particular application is nothing but the particular, “actual” interpretation ∗ chosen for the language — the function
that sends every formula F to the computational problem F∗ represented by F . An answer comes very naturally. The
nonlogical atoms of Int represent the computational problems of interest in a given application, so the interpretation
P∗ of each such atom P should be in U . And, since there is no shortage of such atoms, we may assume that vice
versa is also always true: every element of U is P∗ for some nonlogical atom P . The order in which the elements of
U are arranged is just a typically irrelevant technicality, and among the natural arrangements is the one determined
by the lexicographic order of the Ps. So, U = 〈P∗1 , P∗2 , P∗3 , . . .〉, where P1, P2, P3, . . . is the lexicographic list of all
nonlogical atoms, presents itself as a natural choice for the problem universe for any given application— interpretation
∗, that is — of the language of Int. An alternative approach would be to stipulate that U = 〈F∗1 , F∗2 , F∗3 , . . .〉,
where F1, F2, F3, . . . is the lexicographic list of all Int-formulas rather than just nonlogical atoms. But this technical
alternative is not worth considering. It follows from the later-proven Lemma 4.1 that every universal problem of
〈P∗1 , P∗2 , P∗3 , . . .〉 is automatically also a universal problem of 〈F∗1 , F∗2 , F∗3 , . . .〉 and vice versa. This means that the
two approaches would be the same in every reasonable sense.
The agreed-on problem universe U = 〈P∗1 , P∗2 , P∗3 , . . .〉 would, however, have many universal problems, and the
next question to ask is which one should count as the universal problem $∗ of U . Our answer is:
$ can be interpreted as any — up to equivalence — universal problem of U . (2)
Let us clarify this. Why “any” is obvious: depending on needs or taste, different universal problems of U can be
chosen to be treated as “the” universal problem. In most typical cases the universal problem would be an element of
the problem universe or equivalent to such, even though Definition 2.3 does not insist on this. Going back to our earlier
examples, as the universal problem of the corresponding universe, one could have chosen the halting problem instead
of the acceptance problem for the UTM; or, alternatively, the strictly stronger problem of arithmetical truth could have
been chosen, i.e. the problem ux(True(x) unionsq ¬True(x)), where True(x) is the predicate “x is the Go¨del number of a
true arithmetical sentence”. And, in the complexity theory example, the Hamiltonian path problem could have been
chosen instead of 3-satisfiability; or, alternatively, there could have been reasons to choose some PSPACE-complete
problem as the universal problem instead of an NP-complete problem.
As for “up to equivalence”, it indicates the somewhat relaxed meaning of “any” in (2) and our subsequent
discussion of it. What (2) says, in precise terms, is that, for any universal problem B of U , $ is always allowed to be
interpreted as a certain problem which is equivalent (in the sense of Section 6 of [15]) to B, but not necessarily equal
to B in the literal sense. Specifically, CL limits the officially admissible interpretations of $ to what is calls standard
universal problems ofU . As will be argued shortly, such a limitation is harmless, yielding no loss of generality or loss
of potential applicability of Int. Briefly, this is so because, as it turns out, every universal problem of U is equivalent
to some standard universal problem of U , with standard universal problems thus representing the equivalence classes
of all possible universal problems (serving as “standard representatives” of those equivalence classes). But let us see
the formal definitions first.
Definition 2.4. Let U = 〈A2, A3, A4, . . .〉 be a problem universe.
1. For a problem A1, the A1-based standard universal problem of U is the problem B defined as follows:
• LrBe = {〈〉} ∪ {〈⊥i,Γ 〉 | i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, . . .}, Γ ∈ LrAie }.
• WnBe 〈〉 = >; WnBe 〈⊥i,Γ 〉 =WnAie 〈Γ 〉.
2. A standard universal problem B of U is the A1-based standard universal problem of U for some problem A1;
the latter is said to be the base of B.
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Notice that the A1-based standard universal problem of U = 〈A2, A3, A4, . . .〉 is nothing but the infinite choice
conjunction
B = A1 u A2 u A3 u A4 u . . . .
It is also easy to see that such a B is indeed a universal problem of U . A strategy that wins B → Ai for any Ai ∈ U
is to select the conjunct Ai of the infinite conjunction B thus bringing the game down to Ai → Ai , and then continue
the rest of the play using the standard copy-cat methods (namely, the strategy CCS defined in Section 4).
Definition 2.5. An interpretation is a function that sends every atom Q of the language of Int to a static game Q∗
such that, where P1, P2, . . . is the lexicographic list of all nonlogical atoms, $∗ is a standard universal problem of the
universe 〈P∗1 , P∗2 , . . .〉. This function extends to compound Int-formulas by stipulating that:
(E ◦– F)∗ = E∗ ◦– F∗;
(E unionsq F)∗ = E∗ unionsq F∗;
(E u F)∗ = E∗ u F∗.
Next, as in [15], an Int-formula E is said to be:
• valid iff, for every interpretation ∗, |H E∗;
• uniformly valid iff there is an EPM or HPMM, called a uniform solution for E , such that, for every interpretation
∗,M |H E∗.
As in [15], `` E is a symbolic way to say that E is valid, `` E means that E is uniformly valid, andM `` E means
thatM is a uniform solution for E .
It is clear that the promised completeness of Int with respect to the semantics of CL (i.e. with respect to
validity and/or uniform validity) would automatically remain true under various — whatever — liberalizations of our
definitions of the concepts of universal problem and interpretation. But, in fact, this is so not only for completeness.
One can also show that Int would remain sound with respect to validity even if Definition 2.3 did not have the
‘furthermore’ clause 2, and Definition 2.5 allowed $ to be interpreted as any (rather than necessarily standard)
universal problem of the universe 〈P∗1 , P∗2 , . . .〉 or 〈F∗1 , F∗2 , . . .〉. The reason for our choosing the present, seemingly
unnecessarily capricious, definitions is to ensure the soundness of Int not only with respect to validity, but with respect
to uniform validity as well. Our choice does achieve this highly desirable effect while, at the same time, sacrifices no
generality or applicability. The point is that when it comes to computability, equivalent problems are “the same” in all
relevant aspects and hence can be thought of as being identical. Specifically, when A and A′ are equivalent, then A is
computable if and only if A′ is so, and any compound problem where A is a component (e.g. A ◦–C , C unionsq (A u D),
etc.) is computable if and only if the result of replacing in it A with A′ is so. But, as proven in [6] (Proposition 23.4),
we have:
Any universal problem B of any given problem universe is equivalent to the B-based standard universal problem
B ′ of the same universe.
So, whether $ is translated as the above B or B ′ has no effect on the computability status of the problems represented
by formulas. Furthermore, one could show that there is an effective procedure for converting any solution of the
problem represented by an arbitrary formula F when $ is read as B into a solution of the problem represented by the
same formula when $ is read as B ′, and vice versa. This makes the difference between the two readings of $ negligible,
and allows us to safely restrict our focus only to the official interpretation of $ as B ′, even if the universal problem of
our original and direct interest was B.
2.4. Main theorem
By a Σ1-predicate we mean a predicate that can be written as ∃zA for some decidable finitary predicate
(elementary game) A. And a Boolean combination of Σ1-predicates is a ¬,∧,∨-combination of such games. We
denote the set of all Boolean combinations of Σ1-predicates by
Σ B1 .
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Next, we let
unionsqΣ B1
stand for the set of all games of the formunionsqx A, where A ∈ Σ B1 .
Next, let ∗ be an interpretation and C a set of static games, such as Σ B1 orunionsqΣ B1 . We say that ∗ is of complexity C
iff the following two conditions are satisfied:
• for every nonlogical atom P , P∗ is in C ;
• the base of $∗ is also in C .
Theorem 2.6. For any Int-formula K , Int ` K iff `` K iff `` K. Furthermore:
(a) There is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary Int-proof of an arbitrary formula K and constructs a
uniform solution for K .
(b) If an Int-formula K is not provable in Int, then K ∗ is not computable for some interpretation ∗ of complexityunionsqΣ B1 .
The soundness part of this theorem in the strong sense of clause (a) will be proven in Section 4. And a proof of the
completeness part in the strong sense of clause (b) will be given in Sections 6 through 10.
3. Affine logic
The present paper is only concerned with intuitionistic logic. Yet we need to take a close and fresh look at the more
expressive (even though not deductively stronger) affine logic, because it is going to be a heavily exploited tool in our
soundness and completeness proof for Int.
3.1. Syntax and computability-logic semantics
The language of what we in this paper refer to as affine logic (Al) has the same set of atoms as the language of
Int, that is, infinitely many nonlogical atoms plus one logical atom $. Its connectives are the unary ¬,◦| ,◦| and the
variable-arity — n-ary for each n ≥ 2 — operators ∨,∧,unionsq,u. In the formulas of this language, to which we refer as
Al-formulas, the operators→ and ◦– are understood as abbreviations, defined by
• E → F = ¬E ∨ F ;
• E ◦– F = ◦| E → F .
Also, when applied to nonatomic formulas, ¬ is understood as an abbreviation defined by:
• ¬¬E = E ;
• ¬◦| E = ◦|¬E ;
• ¬◦| E = ◦|¬E ;
• ¬(E1 ∨ · · · ∨ En) = ¬E1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬En ;
• ¬(E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En) = ¬E1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬En ;
• ¬(E1 unionsq · · · unionsq En) = ¬E1 u · · · u ¬En ;
• ¬(E1 u · · · u En) = ¬E1 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬En .
We continue to use X , Y , Z , T , P , Q, R, W as metavariables for nonlogical atoms, E , F , G, H , K for formulas,
and G, H for finite sequences of formulas. We will also be underlining complex expressions, as in ◦| G. The latter
should be understood as a sequence ◦| G1, . . . , ◦| Gn of ◦| -prefixed formulas.
The definition of an interpretation for the language of Al is literally the same as that for the language of Int
given in Section 2.3, and any interpretation ∗ extends to compound Al-formulas in the same way as in the case of
Int-formulas, commuting with all connectives seen as the same-name game operations. That is, (¬E)∗ = ¬E∗,
(◦| E)∗ = ◦| E∗, (E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En)∗ = E∗1 ∧ · · · ∧ E∗n , etc. Next, the definitions of validity (`` ), uniform validity ( `` )
and uniform solution (M `` ) for Int-formulas verbatim extend to all Al-formulas.
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Based on what we know from [15], when it comes to interpretations, it makes virtually no difference whether
→, ◦– and ¬ (the latter when applied to compound formulas) are understood as primitives or just as abbreviations.
This is so because, either by definition or as easily derived facts, for any games A, B, . . . we have A → B = ¬A∨ B,
A ◦– B = ◦| A → B, ¬¬A = A, ¬(A unionsq B) = ¬A u ¬B, etc. Hence, we can and will safely think of the (officially
◦– -containing) language of Int as a sublanguage of the language of Al, with all Int-formulas thus automatically
being also Al-formulas.
An Al-sequent is any finite sequence of Al-formulas. Thus, unlike the case with Int where sequents were two-
sided, in (the axiomatization of) Al we choose one-sided sequents. Below is a Gentzen-style axiomatization of Al. As
always, a formula E is considered provable iff E , as a one-formula sequent, is so. The symbol Al ` will be used for
Al-provability, whether it be for sequents or formulas.
The axioms of Al are all Al-sequents of the form
¬E, E,
and the rules of inference are given by the following schemata, where n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
G, E, F, H
Exchange
G, F, E, H
G
Weakening
G, E
G, ◦| E, ◦| E
◦| -Contraction
G, ◦| E
G, Ei
unionsq-Introduction
G, E1 unionsq · · · unionsq En
G, E1 . . . G, En
u-Introduction
G, E1 u · · · u En
G, E1, . . . , En
∨-Introduction
G, E1 ∨ · · · ∨ En
G1, E1 . . . Gn, En
∧-Introduction
G1, . . . ,Gn, E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En
G, E
◦| -Introduction
G, ◦| E
◦| G, E
◦| -Introduction
◦| G, ◦| E
The above formulation of Al can be called strict. We will, however, usually prefer to work with the equivalent
relaxed version of Al, in which sequents are seen as multisets rather than sequences of formulas. This eliminates the
annoying need for explicitly referring to one or several obvious steps of applying the exchange rule.
Seeing $ as an ordinary— nonlogical— atom, syntactically there is no difference betweenAl and the propositional,
unit-free fragment of Girard’s [4] affine logic. Therefore, in view of known syntactic results for the latter, Al is closed
under the following two rules:
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G, E ¬E, H
Cut
G, H
E E → F
Modus ponens
F
Fact 3.1 (The soundness of Al:). If Al ` K, then `` K and hence `` K (any Al-formula K ).
Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes an arbitrary Al-proof of an arbitrary Al-formula K and
constructs a uniform solution for K .
Proof. Remember logic AL from Section 11 of [15]. If we think of $ as an ordinary (nonlogical) atom, the language
of Al is just a fragment of the language of AL. Furthermore, as the two systems are analytical, AL is a conservative
extension of Al: the fact that $ counts as a logical atom in Al while it is seen as a nonlogical atom in AL, of course,
is irrelevant, as there are no special rules for $ in Al. The special treatment of $ in Al only shows itself in semantics.
Specifically, ignoring the here irrelevant difference that the language of Al is propositional while that of AL is not, the
set of functions that we now call interpretations is a proper subset of the set of functions called interpretations in [15].
With a moment’s thought this can be seen to mean that the concepts of validity, uniform validity or uniform solution
in the sense of [15] are stronger than the same concepts in our present sense. For this reason, Fact 3.1 immediately
follows from the theorem of Section 11 of [15], which says about AL the same as what Fact 3.1 says about Al. 
In concordance with the notational conventions of [15], in what follows {EPMs} stands for the set of all EPMs.
Fact 3.2. For any Al-formulas E,F and any interpretation ∗, we have:
(a) if |H E∗ and |H E∗ → F∗, then |H F∗;
(b) if `` E and `` E → F, then `` F.
Furthermore, there is an effective function f : {EPMs}×{EPMs} −→ {EPMs} such that, for any Al-formulas E, F,
interpretation ∗ and EPMs E, C, we have:
(a) if E |H E∗ and C |H E∗ → F∗, then f (E, C) |H F∗;
(b) if E `` E and C `` E → F, then f (E, C) `` F.
Proof. According to the theorem of Section 10 of [15], computability is closed under modus ponens, in the
constructive sense that there is an effective function f that converts any solutions of arbitrary games A and A → B
into a solution of B, as long as A and B are static. Of course, such a function f (also) works exactly as clause (a) of
the present fact states, for E∗ and F∗ are always static games. And, with a moment’s thought, clause (b) can be seen
to be an immediate corollary of clause (a). 
Fact 3.3. For any Al-formula E and any interpretation ∗, we have:
(a) if |H E∗, then |H ◦| E∗;
(b) if `` E, then `` ◦| E.
Furthermore, there is an effective function h : {EPMs} −→ {EPMs} such that, for any Al-formula E, interpretation ∗
and EPM E , we have:
(a) if E |H E∗, then h(E) |H ◦| E∗;
(b) if E `` E, then h(E) `` ◦| E∗.
Proof. According to one of the lemmas of [15], computability is closed under the rule “from A to ◦| A” in the
constructive sense that there is an effective function h that converts any solution of an arbitrary static game A into a
solution of ◦| A. As in the proof of Fact 3.2, such a function h can be seen to (also) work exactly as the above clause
(a) states. And, again, clause (b) is an immediate corollary of clause (a). 
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3.2. The replacement lemma
An occurrence O of a subformula in a given Al-formula is said to be positive iff it is not in the scope of ¬. An
occurrence of a nonatomic formula would thus always be positive, because officially ¬ cannot be applied to such a
formula.
Lemma 3.4. Let G1, G2, H1, H2 be Al-formulas such that H2 is the result of replacing in H1 a certain positive
occurrence of G1 by G2. Then Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Proof. Assume the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. Let O be the occurrence of G1 in H1 under question. Our
proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of H1 — more precisely, the complexity of H1 minus the complexity
of G1, for the complexity of the G1 part of H1 is irrelevant. We will be working with the relaxed version of Al.
Case 1: H1 = G1. Then H2 = G2, and thus what we need to show is that Al proves ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬G1,G2.
But indeed, this sequent follows from G1 ∧¬G2,¬G1,G2 by ◦| -introduction, and the latter, in turn, follows from the
axioms G1,¬G1 and ¬G2,G2 by ∧-introduction.
Case 2: H1 = ◦| E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O ′ of G1 in E1. Let E2 be
the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O ′ by G2. We thus have H2 = ◦| E2. By the induction hypothesis,
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬E1, E2. From here, by first applying ∨-introduction and then ◦| -introduction, we get Al `◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦| (¬E1 ∨ E2), i.e.
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ¬◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2). (3)
Next, we have:
1. Al ` E1 ∧ ¬E2, ¬E1, E2 (from axioms E1,¬E1 and ¬E2, E2 by ∧-introduction)
2. Al ` ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦|¬E1, E2 (from 1 by ◦| -introduction applied twice)
3. Al ` ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦|¬E1, ◦| E2 (from 2 by ◦| -introduction)
4. Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦|¬E1, ◦| E2 (from (3) and 3 by cut)
Now, the desired Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2 is nothing but an abbreviation of 4.
Case 3: H1 = ◦| E1, and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O ′ of G1 in E1. This case is symmetric to
the previous one. Let E2 be the result of replacing in E1 the occurrence O ′ by G2. We thus have H2 = ◦| E2. For the
same reasons as in Case 2, the provability (3) holds. Next, we have:
1. Al ` E1 ∧ ¬E2, ¬E1, E2 (from axioms E1,¬E1 and ¬E2, E2 by ∧-introduction)
2. Al ` ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ¬E1, ◦| E2 (from 1 by ◦| -introduction applied twice)
3. Al ` ◦| (E1 ∧ ¬E2), ◦|¬E1, ◦| E2 (from 2 by ◦| -introduction)
4. Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦|¬E1, ◦| E2 (from (3) and 3 by cut)
Now, the desired Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2 is nothing but an abbreviation of 4.
Case 4: H1 = E11 ∧ · · · ∧ En1 , and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O ′ of G1 in E i1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Let E i2 be the result of replacing in E
i
1 the occurrence O
′ by G2; for any other ( 6=i) number j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let
E j2 = E j1 . Thus, H2 = E12 ∧ · · · ∧ En2 . By the induction hypothesis, Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬E i1, E i2. From here, by∨-introduction and ◦| -introduction, we get
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ◦| (¬E i1 ∨ E i2),
i.e.
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2), ¬◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2). (4)
Next, we have:
1. Al ` ¬E i2, E i2 (axiom)
2. Al ` ¬E j1 , E j2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} (axiom, because E j1 = E j2 )
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3. Al ` ¬E11 , . . . , ¬E i−11 , ¬E i2, ¬E i+11 , . . . , ¬En1 , E12 ∧ · · · ∧ En2 (from 1 and 2 by ∧-introduction)
4. Al ` E i1, ¬E i1 (axiom)
5. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E11 , . . . , ¬En1 , E12 ∧ · · · ∧ En2 (from 3 and 4 by ∧-introduction)
6. Al ` ◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2), ¬E11 , . . . , ¬En1 , E12 ∧ · · · ∧ En2 (from 5 by ◦| -introduction)
7. Al ` ◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2), ¬E11 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬En1 , E12 ∧ · · · ∧ En2 (from 6 by ∨-introduction)
Now, 7 can be rewritten as Al ` ◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2),¬H1, H2. This, together with (4), by cut, implies the desired
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Case 5: H1 = E11 ∨ · · · ∨ En1 . This case symmetric to the previous one, and we leave details to the reader.
Case 6: H1 = E11 u · · · u En1 , and the occurrence O of G1 in H1 is the occurrence O ′ of G1 in E i1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Let E i2 be the result of replacing in E
i
1 the occurrence O
′ by G2; for any other (6=i) number j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let
E j2 = E j1 . Thus, H2 = E12 u · · · u En2 . Reasoning as we did in Case 4, we again find that (4) holds. Next, we have:
1. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E i1, E i2 (from axioms E i1,¬E i1 and ¬E i2, E i2 by ∧-introduction)
2. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E11 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬En1 , E i2 (from 1 by unionsq-introduction)
3. Al ` ¬E j1 , E j2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} (axiom, because E j1 = E j2 )
4. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E j1 , E j2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} (from 3 by weakening)
5. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E11 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬En1 , E j2 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n} (from 4 by unionsq-introduction)
6. Al ` E i1 ∧ ¬E i2, ¬E11 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬En1 , E12 u · · · u En2 (from 2 and 5 by u-introduction)
7. Al ` ◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2), ¬E11 unionsq · · · unionsq ¬En1 , E12 u · · · u En2 (from 6 by ◦| -introduction)
Now, 7 can be rewritten as Al ` ◦| (E i1 ∧ ¬E i2),¬H1, H2. From here and (4), by cut, we infer the desired
Al ` ◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2.
Case 7: H1 = E11 unionsq · · · unionsq En1 . Symmetric to the previous case, with details left to the reader. 
Lemma 3.5. Let G1, G2, H1, H2 be Al-formulas, E , C be EPMs, and ∗ be an interpretation such that the following
three conditions are satisfied:
1. H2 is the result of replacing in H1 a certain positive occurrence of G1 by G2;
2. E |H H∗1 (resp. E `` H1);
3. C |H G∗1 → G∗2 (resp. C `` G1 → G2).
Then there is an EPM D with D |H H∗2 (resp. D `` H2).
Furthermore, there is a (∗-independent) effective procedure that constructs such an EPMD from arbitrary G1, G2,
H1, H2, E , C.
Proof. Assume all of the conditions of the lemma are satisfied. Let f and h be the functions whose existence is
stated in Facts 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. By Fact 3.3, the assumption C |H G∗1 → G∗2 (resp. C `` G1 → G2)
implies h(C) |H ◦| (G∗1 → G∗2) (resp. h(C) `` ◦| (G1 → G2)). Next, by Lemma 3.4, there is an Al-proof of◦| (G1 ∧ ¬G2),¬H1, H2 and hence — applying ∨-introduction twice and abbreviating the result — an Al-proof
of ◦| (G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2). Of course, such a proof can be found effectively.5 Therefore, in view of
Fact 3.1, we can effectively construct an EPM B with B `` ◦| (G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2) and hence also with
B |H ◦| (G∗1 → G∗2) → (H∗1 → H∗2 ). Then, by Fact 3.2, f (h(C),B) |H H∗1 → H∗2 (resp. f (h(C),B) `` H1 → H2).
But, by condition 2 of the present lemma, E |H H∗1 (resp. E `` H1). Hence, again by Fact 3.2, f (E, f (h(C),B)) |H H∗2
(resp. f (E, f (h(C),B)) `` H2). Letting the soughtD be f (E, f (h(C),B)), we have just demonstrated how to construct
D from G1, G2, H1, H2, E , C. 
5 After all, Al is recursively enumerable, let alone that it is also known to be decidable. Alternatively, a procedure constructing an Al-proof of
◦| (G1 → G2) → (H1 → H2) can be directly extracted from our proof of Lemma 3.4.
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4. The soundness of intuitionistic logic
In this and some subsequent sections we will be constructing EPMs E with the claim that E wins a certain game or
a certain class of games. In our description of such an E and further analysis of its behavior, we will be relying (usually
implicitly) on the clean environment assumption. According to it, the adversary of E never makes moves that are
illegal for the game(s) under question. As pointed out in [15], such an assumption is perfectly safe and legitimate for,
if the adversary makes an illegal move, then E will be the winner no matter what happens afterwards, and making E
the winner is always the very purpose of our construction.
In some of our proofs we will employ a uniform EPM-solution for P → P called the copy-cat strategy (CCS).
This strategy consists in mimicking, in the antecedent, the moves made by the environment in the consequent, and
vice versa. More formally, the algorithm that CCS follows is an infinite loop, in every iteration of which CCS keeps
granting permission until the environment makes a move 1.α (resp. 2.α), to which the machine responds by the move
2.α (resp. 1.α). As shown in the proof of Proposition 22.1 of [6], this strategy is successful for every game of the form
A → A. An important detail is that CCS never looks at the past history of the game, i.e. the movement of its scanning
head on the run tape is exclusively left-to-right. This means that, even if the original game was something else and it
only evolved to A → A later as a result of making a series of moves, switching to the CCS after the game has been
brought down to A → A guarantees success no matter what happened in the past.
Lemma 4.1. For any Int-formula K , `` $ → K. Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes any Int-
formula K and constructs a uniform solution E for $ → K.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of K , below we show how to construct the above uniform solution E in the
form of an EPM. Certain routine details of a verification of the fact that E indeed always wins the game represented
by $ → K will be left to the reader. Some — arbitrary and largely irrelevant — interpretation ∗ will be assumed to
be fixed throughout most of our analysis of the work of E , even though, in all but one case, it will be present only
implicitly: by innocent abuse of terminology and notation, we will not be distinguishing between a formula G and the
game G∗ represented by it, and write G even when, strictly speaking, what is meant is G∗ rather than G.
Case 1: K = $. Just let E = CCS.
Case 2: K is a nonlogical atom. Then, for some number m, K ∗ should be conjunct #m of the infinite u-conjunction
$∗ (note that m does not depend on ∗). We define E to be the EPM that acts as follows. At the beginning, it finds the
above number m and makes the move ‘1.m’, which can be seen to bring the game $ → K down to K → K . After
this move, E switches to (continues the rest of the play as) CCS.
Case 3: K is E ◦– F . Evidently Al ` F → (E ◦– F) and hence, by Fact 3.1, we can construct an EPM A with
A `` F → (E ◦– F). By the induction hypothesis, we also know how to construct and EPM C with C `` $ → F .
Now, Lemma 3.5 allows us to combine A and C and construct the desired E with E `` $ → (E ◦– F).
Case 4: K = E1 unionsq E2. By the induction hypothesis, we know how to construct an EPM C with C `` $ → E1. Now
we define E to be the EPM that first makes the move ‘2.1’, and then plays the rest of the game as C would play. E can
be seen to be successful because its initial move ‘2.1’ brings $ → K down to $ → E1.
Case 5: K = E1 u E2. By the induction hypothesis, two EPMs C1 and C2 can be constructed with C1 `` $ → E1
and C2 `` $ → E2. We define E to be the EPM that acts as follows. At the beginning, E keeps granting permission
until the adversary makes a move α. With the clean environment assumption in mind, α is ‘2.i’ for i = 1 or i = 2,
and it brings $ → E1 u E2 down to $ → Ei . If and after such a move α is made, E continues the rest of the play as
Ci . 
Lemma 4.2. For any Int-formula K , `` ◦| $ → K. Furthermore, there is an effective procedure that takes any Int-
formula K and constructs a uniform solution for ◦| $ → K.
Proof. By Lemma 4.1, we can construct a uniform solution for ¬$∨K . At the same time, evidently Al ` ¬$ → ◦|¬$
and hence, by Fact 3.1, we can also construct a uniform solution for ¬$ → ◦|¬$. Now, Lemma 3.5 allows us to
combine those two uniform solutions and construct a uniform solution for ◦|¬$ ∨ K , i.e. for ◦| $ → K . 
Lemma 4.3. There is an EPM E such that, for any Int-formulas E1 and E2, E is a uniform solution for ◦| E1u◦| E2 →◦| (E1 u E2).
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Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we will write a formula G to mean the game G∗ for whatever (irrelevant)
interpretation ∗. Here is a strategy that the sought E can follow with a guaranteed success. Keep granting permission
until the adversary makes a (legal) move ‘2..i’ (1 ≤ i ≤ 2). Such a move can be seen to bring the game◦| E1 u ◦| E2 → ◦| (E1 u E2) down to ◦| E1 u ◦| E2 → ◦| Ei . Now make the move ‘1.i’, which further brings the game
down to ◦| Ei → ◦| Ei . Finally, switch to CCS. 
Remember that, in this paper, an underlined expression such as G, when occurring in a sequent, stands for a
sequence G1, . . . ,Gn of formulas. We now further agree that, when occurring as a subexpression within a formula,
such an expression will be an abbreviation of G1 ∧ · · · ∧ Gn . This subexpression will always occur within a “larger”
context such as G ∧ F or G → F . Our convention is that, when n = 0, both G ∧ F and G → F simply mean F .
And, of course, when n = 1, G1 ∧ · · · ∧ Gn is just G1.
Next, we agree to understand each Int-sequent G ⇒ K as — and identify with — the Al-formula ◦| G → K .
Remember that where G = G1, . . . ,Gn , ◦| G means ◦| G1, . . . , ◦| Gn , and hence ◦| G → K means ◦| G1∧· · ·∧◦| Gn → K .
Now we are ready to prove the soundness part of Theorem 2.6. Consider an arbitrary Int-sequent S with Int ` S.
By induction on the length of an Int-proof of S, we are going to show that S, understood as a formula according to
the above convention, has a uniform solution E . This is sufficient to conclude that Int is ‘uniformly sound’. Clause (a)
of Theorem 2.6 also claims ‘constructive soundness’, i.e. that such an E can be effectively built from a given Int-proof
of S (at least, when S is an empty-antecedent sequent). This claim of the theorem will be automatically taken care of
by the fact that our proof of the existence of E is constructive: all of the uniform-validity-related lemmas on which
we rely provide a way for actually constructing corresponding uniform solutions. With this remark in mind and for
the considerations of readability, in what follows we only talk about uniform validity without explicitly mentioning
uniform solutions and without explicitly showing how to construct such solutions. Also, we no longer use ⇒ or
◦– , seeing each sequent G ⇒ K as the formula ◦| G → K , and each subformula E1 ◦– E2 of such a formula as
◦| E1 → E2.
There are 11 cases to consider, corresponding to the 11 possible rules (including axioms as “rules” without
premises) that might have been used at the last step of an Int-derivation of S, with S being the conclusion of the rule.
In each non-axiom case below, “induction hypothesis” means the assumption that the premise(s) of the corresponding
rule is (are) uniformly valid. The goal in each case is to show that the conclusion of the rule is also uniformly valid.
In what follows, “soundness” should be understood as Fact 3.1, and “modus ponens” as Fact 3.2. We will work with
the relaxed version of Al, treating Al-sequents as multisets rather than sets of formulas.
Axiom ◦| K → K : Immediately from the obvious fact Al ` ◦| K → K by soundness.
Axiom ◦| $ → K : Immediately from Lemma 4.2.
Exchange: It is easy to verify that Al proves
(◦| G ∧ ◦| E ∧ ◦| F ∧ ◦| H → K ) → (◦| G ∧ ◦| F ∧ ◦| E ∧ ◦| H → K )
and hence, by soundness, this formula is uniformly valid. By the induction hypothesis, so is its antecedent. Hence, by
modus ponens, so is the consequent.
Weakening: Similar to the previous case, relying on the fact that, due to the presence of weakening in Al, the latter
proves (◦| G → K ) → (◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K ).
Contraction: Similar to the previous two cases, relying on the fact that, due to the presence of ◦| -contraction, Al
proves (◦| G ∧ ◦| E ∧ ◦| E → K ) → (◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K ).
Left ◦– : By the induction hypothesis, we have:
`` ◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K1; (5)
`` ◦| H → K2. (6)
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Our goal is to show that
`` ◦| G ∧ ◦| H ∧ ◦| (◦| K2 → E) → K1. (7)
We claim that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by soundness, is uniformly valid:
(◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K1) →
(
◦| (◦| H → K2) →
(
◦| G ∧ ◦| H ∧ ◦| (◦| K2 → E) → K1
))
. (8)
Below is anAl-proof of the above formula for the case when G = G and H = H (both sequences are just one-formula
sequences). Proofs for the cases when G and/or H are longer or shorter, would take different numbers of steps, but
otherwise would be similar.
1. ¬K2, K2 (axiom)
2. ◦| H, ◦|¬H (axiom)
3. ◦| H ∧ ¬K2, ◦|¬H, K2 (from 2 and 1 by ∧-introduction)
4. ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, K2 (from 3 by ◦| -introduction)
5. ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦| K2 (from 4 by ◦| -introduction)
6. E,¬E (axiom)
7. E, ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦| K2 ∧ ¬E (from 5 and 6 by ∧-introduction)
8. E, ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦| K2 ∧ ¬E) (from 7 by ◦| -introduction)
9. ◦| E, ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦| K2 ∧ ¬E) (from 8 by ◦| -introduction)
10. ◦| G, ◦|¬G (axiom)
11. ◦| G ∧ ◦| E, ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬G, ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦| K2 ∧ ¬E) (from 10 and 9 by ∧-introduction)
12. ¬K1, K1 (axiom)
13. (◦| G ∧ ◦| E) ∧ ¬K1, ◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2), ◦|¬G, ◦|¬H, ◦| (◦| K2 ∧ ¬E), K1 (from 11 and 12 by ∧-introduction)
14.
(
(◦| G ∧ ◦| E) ∧ ¬K1
) ∨ (◦| (◦| H ∧ ¬K2) ∨ ((◦|¬G ∨ ◦|¬H ∨ ◦| (◦| K2 ∧ ¬E)) ∨ K1)) (from 13 by ∨-introduction
applied several times)
Now, (8) is just an abbreviation of 14. By Fact 3.3, (6) implies `` ◦| (◦| H → K2). From this, together with (5) and
`` (8), by modus ponens applied twice, we infer the desired (7).
Right ◦– : It is easy to see that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by soundness, is uniformly
valid: (
◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K
)→ (◦| G → (◦| E → K )).
And, by the induction hypothesis, `` ◦| G ∧ ◦| E → K . Applying modus ponens, we get `` ◦| G → (◦| E → K ).
Left unionsq: By the induction hypothesis, we have:
`` ◦| G ∧ ◦| E1 → K ; (9)
`` ◦| G ∧ ◦| E2 → K . (10)
Our goal is to show that
`` ◦| G ∧ ◦| (E1 unionsq E2) → K . (11)
We claim that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by soundness, is uniformly valid:(
◦| G ∧ ◦| E1 → K
)→ ((◦| G ∧ ◦| E2 → K )→ ((¬◦| G ∨ (◦|¬E1 u ◦|¬E2)) ∨ K )). (12)
As was done when discussing Left ◦– , below we only give an Al-proof of the above formula for the case when
G = G. The case when G is empty is simpler, and the cases when G contains more than one formula would take more
steps but otherwise would be similar.
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1. ◦| G ∧ ◦| E1, ¬◦| G, ◦|¬E1 (from axioms ◦| G,¬◦| G and ◦| E1, ◦|¬E1 by ∧-introduction)
2. (◦| G ∧ ◦| E1) ∧ ¬K , ¬◦| G, ◦|¬E1, K (from 1 and axiom ¬K , K by ∧-introduction)
3. (◦| G ∧ ◦| E1) ∧ ¬K , (◦| G ∧ ◦| E2) ∧ ¬K , ¬◦| G, ◦|¬E1, K (from 2 by weakening)
4. (◦| G ∧ ◦| E1) ∧ ¬K , (◦| G ∧ ◦| E2) ∧ ¬K , ¬◦| G, ◦|¬E2, K (similar to 3)
5. (◦| G ∧ ◦| E1) ∧ ¬K , (◦| G ∧ ◦| E2) ∧ ¬K , ¬◦| G, ◦|¬E1 u ◦|¬E2, K (from 3 and 4 by u-introduction)
6.
(
(◦| G∧◦| E1)∧¬K
)∨(((◦| G∧◦| E2)∧¬K )∨ ((¬◦| G∨ (◦|¬E1u◦|¬E2))∨K )) (from 5 by ∨-introduction applied
several times)
Now, (12) is just an abbreviation of 6. From (9), (10) and `` (12), by modus ponens applied twice, we infer
`` (¬◦| G ∨ (◦|¬E1 u ◦|¬E2)) ∨ K .
But, by Lemma 4.3, `` ◦|¬E1u◦|¬E2 → ◦| (¬E1u¬E2). Applying Lemma 3.5, we find `` (¬◦| G∨◦| (¬E1u¬E2))∨K ,
which is nothing but a disabbreviation of the desired (11).
Right unionsq: By the induction hypothesis, `` ◦| G → Ki . Of course, we also have Al ` Ki → K1 unionsq K2 and thus
`` Ki → K1 unionsq K2. Hence, by Lemma 3.5, `` ◦| G → K1 unionsq K2.
Left u: By the induction hypothesis, `` ◦| G ∧◦| Ei → K , i.e. `` (◦|¬G ∨◦|¬Ei )∨ K . Obviously we also have Al `◦|¬Ei → ◦| (¬E1unionsq¬E2) and thus `` ◦|¬Ei → ◦| (¬E1unionsq¬E2). Hence, by Lemma 3.5, `` (◦|¬G∨◦| (¬E1unionsq¬E2))∨K ,
i.e. `` ◦| G ∧ ◦| (E1 u ¬E2) → K .
Right u: By the induction hypothesis, `` ◦| G → K1 and `` ◦| G → K2. Next, one could easily verify that Al proves
(◦| G → K1) →
(
(◦| G → K2) → (◦| G → K1 u K2)
)
,
so this formula is uniformly valid. Applying modus ponens twice yields the desired `` ◦| G → K1 u K2.
5. Machines vs. machines
As noted earlier, the rest of this paper is devoted to a proof of the completeness part of Theorem 2.6. The present
section borrows a discussion from [8], providing certain background information necessary for our completeness
proof but missing in [15], the only external source on computability logic on which this paper was promised to rely.
Remember that ¬Γ , when Γ is a run, means the result of reversing all labels in Γ . For a run Γ and a computation
branch B of an HPM or EPM, we say that B cospells Γ iff B spells ¬Γ in the sense of Section 6 of [15]. Intuitively,
when a machineM plays as ⊥ (rather than >), then the run that is generated by a given computation branch B ofM
is the run cospelled (rather than spelled) by B, for the moves thatM makes get the label ⊥, and the moves that its
adversary makes get the label >.
We say that an EPM E is fair iff, for every valuation e, every e-computation branch of E is fair in the sense of
Section 6 of [15].
Lemma 5.1. Assume E is a fair EPM, H is any HPM, and e is any valuation. There are a uniquely defined e-
computation branch BE of E and a uniquely defined e-computation branch BH ofH—which we respectively call the
(E, e,H)-branch and the (H, e, E)-branch — such that the run spelled by BH, called the H vs. E run on e, is the
run cospelled by BE .
When H, E, e are as above, Γ is the H vs. E run on e and A is a game with WnAe 〈Γ 〉 = > (resp. WnAe 〈Γ 〉 = ⊥),
we say thatH wins (resp. loses) A against E on e.
A strict proof of the above lemma can be found in [6] (Lemma 20.4), and we will not reproduce the formal proof
here. Instead, the following intuitive explanation should suffice:
Proof idea. AssumeH, E , e are as in Lemma 5.1. The play that we are going to describe is the unique play generated
when the two machines play against each other, with H in the role of >, E in the role of ⊥, and e spelled on the
valuation tapes of both machines. We can visualize this play as follows. Most of the time during the process H
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remains inactive (sleeping); it is woken up only when E enters a permission state, on which event H makes a (one
single) transition to its next computation step — that may or may not result in making a move — and goes back to
sleep that will continue until E enters a permission state again, and so on. From E’s perspective, H acts as a patient
adversary who makes one or zero move only when granted permission, just as the EPM-model assumes. And from
H’s perspective, who, like a person in a comma, has no sense of time during its sleep and hence can think that the
wake-up events that it calls the beginning of a clock cycle happen at a constant rate, E acts as an adversary who can
make any finite number of moves during a clock cycle (i.e. while H was sleeping), just as the HPM-model assumes.
This scenario uniquely determines an e-computation branch BE of E that we call the (E, e,H)-branch, and an e-
computation branch BH ofH that we call the (H, e, E)-branch. What we call theH vs. E run on e is the run generated
in this play. In particular — since we let H play in the role of >— this is the run spelled by BH. E , who plays in the
role of ⊥, sees the same run, only it sees the labels of the moves of that run in negative colors. That is, BE cospells
rather than spells that run. This is exactly what Lemma 5.1 asserts. 
6. Dedollarization
As we remember, the language of Int, unlike that of Al, treats u as a strictly binary operator. Yet in this section
we will be writing expressions E1 u · · · u En for unspecified n ≥ 1 and treating them as legitimate (subformulas of)
Int-formulas. Such an expression should be understood as an abbreviation of E1 u (E2 u (. . .u En) . . .)); when n = 1,
E1 u · · · u En simply means E1.
An Int-formula is said to be dollarless iff it does not contain $; and an Int-sequent is dollarless iff all of its
formulas are so.
Definition 6.1. Let K be an Int-formula, P1, . . . , Pn all of its nonlogical atoms listed according to the lexicographic
order, and P0 lexicographically the smallest nonlogical atom not occurring in K . Then what we call the
dedollarization of K is the result of replacing in K every occurrence of $ by the formula P0 u P1 u · · · u Pn .
Note that the dedollarization of a given formula is (indeed) a dollarless formula.
Lemma 6.2. Whenever the dedollarization of an Int-formula K is provable in Int, so is K itself.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary Int-formula K , and let F be its dedollarization. We assume that K , P0, P1, . . . , Pn are as
in Definition 6.1. Suppose Int ` F . Let G be the result of replacing in F every occurrence of P0 by $. Int-provability
is known to be closed under replacing nonlogical atoms by whatever formulas, so we have Int ` G. Next, it is obvious
that ||≡ $ ◦–◦ $ u P1 u · · · u Pn . This, by Lemma 2.1, implies that ||≡ G ◦–◦ K , because K is nothing but the result of
replacing in G (every occurrence of) $ u P1 u · · · u Pn by $. Now, in view of the soundness and completeness of Int
with respect to Kripke semantics, the facts Int ` G and ||≡ G ◦–◦ K can be seen to immediately imply Int ` K . 
Lemma 6.3. Assume K is an Int-formula, F its dedollarization, and ◦ an interpretation of a complexity C such that
6|H F◦. Then there is an interpretation ∗ of the same complexity C such that 6|H K ∗.
Proof. Assume K , F , ◦ and C are as in the conditions of Lemma 6.3. We further assume that K , P0, P1, . . . , Pn are
as in Definition 6.1. We select ∗ to be the unique interpretation such that:
• P∗0 = P◦0 , P∗1 = P◦1 , . . . , P∗n = P◦n ;• for any nonlogical atom Q with Q 6∈ {P0, P1, . . . , Pn}, Q∗ = P∗0 (i.e. Q∗ = P◦0 );• the base of $∗ is P∗0 (i.e. P◦0 ).
Obviously ∗ remains of complexity C . We claim that
|H $∗ → P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n ;|H P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n → $∗. (13)
To prove the above, let us fix Q1, Q2, . . . as the lexicographic list of all nonlogical atoms of the language of Int.
$∗ thus can and will be seen as the infinite conjunction P∗0 u Q∗1 u Q∗2 u . . .. In what follows, as always, we rely on
the clean environment assumption. Also, we pretend that P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n is literally P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n rather
than an abbreviation of P∗0 u (P∗1 u (. . . u P∗n ) . . .)) which it, strictly speaking, is. This innocent and easy-to-correct
inaccuracy is just to simplify our descriptions of winning strategies.
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Here is a relaxed description and analysis of an EPM-strategy for
$∗ → P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n ,
i.e. for
(P∗0 u Q∗1 u Q∗2 u . . .) → (P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n ).
Wait until the environment selects a conjunct P∗i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) in the consequent. Pi is Q j for a certain j . So, select
the conjunct Q∗j in the antecedent, and then switch to the copy-cat strategy CCS. A win is guaranteed because the first
two moves have brought the game down to Q∗j → P∗i , i.e. P∗i → P∗i .
Next, here is a strategy for
P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n → $∗,
i.e. for
(P∗0 u P∗1 u · · · u P∗n ) → (P∗0 u Q∗1 u Q∗2 u . . .).
Wait till the environment selects a conjunct of the consequent. If the selected conjunct is Q∗i such that Qi = Pj
for some 0 ≤ j ≤ n, then select the conjunct P∗j in the antecedent. This brings the game down to P∗j → Q∗i ,
i.e. P∗j → P∗j , so switching to CCS at this point guarantees success. And otherwise, if the selected conjunct of the
consequent was P∗0 , or Q∗i such that Qi 6∈ {P0, . . . , Pn} so that (by our choice of ∗) Q∗i = P∗0 , then select the conjunct
P∗0 in the antecedent. This brings the game down to P∗0 → P∗0 , so, again, switching to CCS at this point guarantees
success. (13) is thus proven.
Now, it is our assumption that 6|H F◦. But ∗ agrees with ◦ on all atoms of F , and hence F◦ = F∗. So, 6|H F∗.
This, in view of (13) and Lemma 3.5, can be seen to imply that 6|H K ∗, because F is the result of replacing in K (all
occurrences of) $ by P0 u P1 u · · · u Pn . 
7. Standardization
We say that an Int-sequent is standard iff it is
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦– Z1 unionsq T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦– Zk unionsq Tk),
(P1 ◦– Q1) ◦– R1, . . . , (Pk ◦– Qk) ◦– Rk
}
⇒ W
where k ≥ 0, and the X i , Yi , Zi , Ti , Pi , Qi , Ri (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and W are nonlogical atoms.
Note that, by definition, a standard Int-sequent is always dollarless.
Where K is a dollarless Int-formula and H is a subformula of it, throughout this section we will be using the
notation
H K
for a certain atom intended to be the “standard atomic name” assigned by us to H as a subformula of K . Specifically, let
G1, . . . ,Gm be all of the non-atomic subformulas of K — including K itself — listed according to the lexicographic
order, and let W1, . . . ,Wm be the first (in the lexicographic order) m nonlogical atoms of the language of Int not
occurring in K . Then we define the atom H K by stipulating that:
• H K = H if H is atomic;
• H K = Wi if H = Gi (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
Definition 7.1. Let K be a dollarless Int-formula, and let
A1 = B1 ◦–C1, . . . , Aa = Ba ◦–Ca,
D1 = E1 unionsq F1, . . . , Dd = Ed unionsq Fd ,
G1 = H1 u I1, . . . , Gg = Hg u Ig
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be all of its non-atomic subformulas, with each of the three groups listed according to the lexicographic order. Then
we define the standardization of K as the Int-sequent obtained by appending 3d+3g extra copies of the last formula
(BKa ◦–CKa ) ◦– AKa to the antecedent of the following sequent:
AK1 ◦– (BK1 ◦–CK1 unionsq CK1 ), . . . , AKa ◦– (BKa ◦–CKa unionsq CKa ),
EK1 ◦– (EK1 ◦– DK1 unionsq DK1 ), . . . , EKd ◦– (EKd ◦– DKd unionsq DKd ),
FK1 ◦– (FK1 ◦– DK1 unionsq DK1 ), . . . , FKd ◦– (FKd ◦– DKd unionsq DKd ),
DK1 ◦– (DK1 ◦– EK1 unionsq FK1 ), . . . , DKd ◦– (DKd ◦– EKd unionsq FKd ),
GK1 ◦– (GK1 ◦– H K1 unionsq H K1 ), . . . , GKg ◦– (GKg ◦– H Kg unionsq H Kg ),
GK1 ◦– (GK1 ◦– I K1 unionsq I K1 ), . . . , GKg ◦– (GKg ◦– I Kg unionsq I Kg ),
H K1 ◦– (I K1 ◦– GK1 unionsq GK1 ), . . . , H Kg ◦– (I Kg ◦– GKg unionsq GKg ),
(BK1 ◦–CK1 ) ◦– AK1 , . . . , (BKa ◦–CKa ) ◦– AKa

⇒ K K .
Observe that the standardization of a dollarless Int-formula is always (indeed) a standard sequent.
Lemma 7.2. Let K be a dollarless Int-formula, G ⇒ W its standardization, and K a Kripke model with K ||≡ G.
Then every subformula H of K is K-equivalent to H K . Specifically, as K K = W, we have K ||≡ K ◦–◦W.
Proof. Let K , G ⇒ W , K = (W,R, |≡ ) be as the lemma assumes, and H be any subformula of K . We need to
show that K ||≡ H ◦–◦ H K , which will be done by induction on the complexity of H .
Case 1: H is atomic. Then H K = H , so this case is trivial.
Case 2: H = E ◦– F . Then H K ◦– (EK ◦– FK unionsq FK ) and (EK ◦– FK ) ◦– H K are among the formulas of G.
Therefore, as K ||≡ G, we have
K ||≡ H K ◦– (EK ◦– FK unionsq FK ), (EK ◦– FK ) ◦– H K . (14)
But, by the induction hypothesis,K ||≡ EK ◦–◦ E andK ||≡ FK ◦–◦ F . Of course, we also haveK ||≡ FK unionsqFK ◦–◦ FK .
Therefore, in view of Fact 2.1, (14) can be rewritten as
K ||≡ H K ◦– (E ◦– F), (E ◦– F) ◦– H K .
As (E ◦– F) = H , the above means nothing but that K ||≡ H ◦–◦ H K .
Case 3: H = E unionsq F . Then
K ||≡ EK ◦– (EK ◦– H K unionsq H K ), FK ◦– (FK ◦– H K unionsq H K ), H K ◦– (H K ◦– EK unionsq FK ),
because G contains the above three formulas and K ||≡ G. But, by the induction hypothesis, EK and FK are K-
equivalent to E and F , respectively. Hence, by Fact 2.1,
K ||≡ E ◦– (E ◦– H K unionsq H K ), F ◦– (F ◦– H K unionsq H K ) (15)
and
K ||≡ H K ◦– (H K ◦– E unionsq F). (16)
Consider any world p with p |≡ H K . By (16), we also have p |≡ H K ◦– (H K ◦– E unionsq F). Hence, with a moment’s
thought, it can be seen that p |≡ E unionsq F , i.e. p |≡ H . As p was arbitrary, we conclude that
K ||≡ H K ◦– H . (17)
Next, consider any world p with p |≡ H , i.e. p |≡ E unionsq F . We should have p |≡ E or p |≡ F . Suppose the former is
the case (the latter is, of course, similar). From (15) we also know that p |≡ E ◦– (E ◦– H K unionsq H K ). Hence it can be
seen that p |≡ H K . Again, as p was arbitrary, we conclude that
K ||≡ H ◦– H K . (18)
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Now, (17) and (18) together mean nothing but that K ||≡ H ◦–◦ H K .
Case 4: H = E u F . Then, for reasons already familiar to us, we have
K ||≡ H K ◦– (H K ◦– EK unionsq EK ), H K ◦– (H K ◦– FK unionsq FK ), EK ◦– (FK ◦– H K unionsq H K ).
By the induction hypothesis, K ||≡ EK ◦–◦ E and K ||≡ FK ◦–◦ F , and hence
K ||≡ H K ◦– (H K ◦– E unionsq E), H K ◦– (H K ◦– F unionsq F) (19)
and
K ||≡ E ◦– (F ◦– H K unionsq H K ). (20)
Consider any world p. Suppose p |≡ H , i.e. p |≡ E u F , meaning that p |≡ E and p |≡ F . Then, from (20), we can
see that p |≡ H K . Now, for vice versa, suppose p |≡ H K . Then, from (19), we can see that p |≡ E and p |≡ F , which
means that p |≡ E uF , i.e. p |≡ H . Thus, p |≡ H iff p |≡ H K . This, as p was arbitrary, means thatK ||≡ H ◦–◦ H K . 
Lemma 7.3. Assume K is a dollarless Int-formula, and G ⇒ W is its standardization. Then Int ` K ,G ⇒ W.
Proof. Assume, for a contradiction, that G ⇒ W is the standardization of a dollarless Int-formula K , and Int 6`
K ,G ⇒ W . Then, by the completeness of Int with respect to Kripke semantics, there is a model K = (W,R, |≡ )
with K /||≡ K ,G ⇒ W , meaning that, for some world p ∈W , we have p |≡ K , p |≡ G and p /|≡W . Obviously we may
assume here that p = 1, so that K ||≡ G. Then, by Lemma 7.2, K ||≡ K ◦–◦W . But this is a contradiction, because we
have 1 |≡ K and 1 /|≡W . 
Lemma 7.4. Assume K is a dollarless Int-formula, G ⇒ W is its standardization, and Int 6` K. Then Int 6` G ⇒ W.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary dollarless Int-formula K and its standardization G ⇒ W . We assume that all of the
conditions of Definition 7.1 regarding the subformulas of K are satisfied, so that each formula of G is one of the
formulas of the antecedent of the sequent displayed in that definition.
Suppose Int 6` K . Then, by the completeness of Int with respect to Kripke semantics, there is a model K with
K /||≡ K . We may assume here that, for every subformula H of K , K ||≡ H K ◦–◦ H . Indeed, when H is atomic, then it
is automatically K-equivalent to H K because H = H K . And if H is not atomic, then H K is not among the atoms of
K , and we may make arbitrary assumptions regarding what worlds force H K without affecting the fact that K /||≡ K ;
so, our assumption is that H K is forced exactly by the worlds that force H .
Now we claim that K ||≡ G. To prove this claim, pick an arbitrary formula G of G. We need to show that K ||≡ G.
Looking back at the sequent displayed in Definition 7.1, there are 8 cases to consider, depending on the form of G.
Here we will only consider the case
G = AKi ◦– (BKi ◦–CKi unionsq CKi ),
leaving the other 7 cases as rather similar and equally easy exercises for the reader. Remember that, by our
assumptions, for every relevant formula H (here H ∈ {Ai , Bi ,Ci }) we have K ||≡ H K ◦–◦ H . So, in view of Fact 2.1,
in order to verify that K ||≡ G, it would suffice to show that K ||≡ Ai ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci unionsq Ci ). But, by the conditions
of Definition 7.1, Ai = Bi ◦–Ci . So, our task reduces to showing that K ||≡ (Bi ◦–Ci ) ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci unionsq Ci ). Since
K ||≡Ci unionsq Ci ◦–◦Ci , this task further reduces to “showing” the trivial fact that K ||≡ (Bi ◦–Ci ) ◦– (Bi ◦–Ci ).
Thus, we consider K ||≡ G proven. Then, by Lemma 7.2, K ||≡W ◦–◦ K . But K /||≡ K , and thus K /||≡W . This means
that K /||≡ G ⇒ W . Consequently, by the soundness of Int with respect to Kripke semantics, Int 6` G ⇒ W . 
8. Desequentization
Consider an arbitrary standard Int-sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦– Z1 unionsq T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦– Zk unionsq Tk),
(P1 ◦– Q1) ◦– R1, . . . , (Pk ◦– Qk) ◦– Rk
}
⇒ W. (21)
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For any positive integer n, we define the n-desequentization of the above sequent (21) as the following Al-formula
(22) where, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and p ∈ {1, . . . , n},
P pj = Pj and Q pj = Q j ,
and where E1 ∧ · · · ∧ En is understood as just E1 when n = 1:
◦|
(
X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1 unionsq T1
) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (Xk ∧ Yk → Zk unionsq Tk) ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P11 → Q11) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pn1 → Qn1) → R1
) ∧ · · · ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P1k → Q1k) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pnk → Qnk ) → Rk
) → W. (22)
Lemma 8.1. Assume n is an arbitrary positive integer, K is a dollarless Int-formula, and D is the n-desequentization
of the standardization of K . Then, for any interpretation ◦ with |H K ◦, we have |H D◦.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary n ≥ 1, an arbitrary dollarless Int-formula K and an arbitrary interpretation ◦ with |H K ◦.
We assume that (21) is the standardization of K , so that the n-desequentization D of the standardization of K is (22).
Using G1, . . . ,G2k as abbreviations of the 2k formulas of the antecedent of (21), we rewrite (21) as
G1, . . . ,G2k ⇒ W.
According to Lemma 7.3,
Int ` K ,G1, . . . ,G2k ⇒ W.
From here, applying the Right ◦– rule 2k + 1 times, we get
Int ` K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .))
and hence, by the already established soundness of Int,
`` K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .)). (23)
Next, in a routine syntactic exercise, one can show that the following formula is provable in Al and hence, by the
soundness of Al, it is uniformly valid:(
K ◦– (G1 ◦– (G2 ◦– . . . (G2k ◦–W ) . . .))
)
→
(
◦| K → (◦| G1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| G2k → W )
)
.
(24)
From (23) and `` (24), in view of Fact 3.2, we find
|H ◦| K ◦ → (◦| G1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| G2k → W )◦. (25)
By Fact 3.3, our assumption |H K ◦ implies |H ◦| K ◦. This, in turn, together with (25), again by Fact 3.2, implies
|H (◦| G1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| G2k → W )◦.
If we now disabbreviate the Gi s, the formula ◦| G1 ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| G2s → W rewrites as
◦|
(
◦| X1 → (◦| Y1 → Z1 unionsq T1)
) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (◦| Xk → (◦| Yk → Zk unionsq Tk))
∧ ◦|
(
◦| (◦| P1 → Q1) → R1
) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (◦| (◦| Pk → Qk) → Rk) → W,
which, in turn, is an abbreviation of

◦|
(
◦| X1 ∧
(
◦| Y1 ∧ ¬(Z1 unionsq T1)
)) ∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
◦| Xk ∧
(
◦| Yk ∧ ¬(Zk unionsq Tk)
)) ∨
◦|
(
◦| (◦| P1 → Q1) ∧ ¬R1
)
∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
◦| (◦| Pk → Qk) ∧ ¬Rk
)

∨ W. (26)
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So, |H (26)◦. Now, of course, Al proves
◦| X i ∧
(
◦| Yi ∧ ¬(Zi unionsq Ti )
) → (◦| X i ∧ ◦| Yi ) ∧ ¬(Zi unionsq Ti )
and hence, by the soundness of Al, the above formula is uniformly valid for each 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Therefore, starting from
the fact |H (26)◦ and applying Lemma 3.5 k times, we find that the following formula is uniformly valid:
◦|
(
(◦| X1 ∧ ◦| Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 unionsq T1)
)
∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
(◦| Xk ∧ ◦| Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk unionsq Tk)
)
∨
◦|
(
◦| (◦| P1 → Q1) ∧ ¬R1
)
∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
◦| (◦| Pk → Qk) ∧ ¬Rk
)

∨ W. (27)
Next, due to the presence of ◦| -contraction, Al clearly proves
◦| (◦| Pi → Qi ) → ◦| (◦| P1i → Q1i ) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (◦| Pni → Qni )
(any 1 ≤ i ≤ k) and, by soundness, the above formula is uniformly valid. Therefore, starting from |H (27)◦ and
applying Lemma 3.5 k times, we find that the following formula is uniformly valid:
◦|
(
(◦| X1 ∧ ◦| Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 unionsq T1)
)
∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
(◦| Xk ∧ ◦| Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk unionsq Tk)
)
∨
◦|
((
◦| (◦| P11 → Q11) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (◦| Pn1 → Qn1)
) ∧ ¬R1) ∨ · · · ∨
◦|
((
◦| (◦| P1k → Q1k) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (◦| Pnk → Qnk )
) ∧ ¬Rk)

∨ W. (28)
Next, consider the formula
◦|
(
(X1 ∧ Y1) ∧ ¬(Z1 unionsq T1)
)
∨ · · · ∨
◦|
(
(Xk ∧ Yk) ∧ ¬(Zk unionsq Tk)
)
∨
◦|
((
(◦| P11 → Q11) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pn1 → Qn1)
) ∧ ¬R1) ∨ · · · ∨
◦|
((
(◦| P1k → Q1k) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pnk → Qnk )
) ∧ ¬Rk)

∨ W. (29)
Observe that (29) is nothing but the result of deleting ◦| before every subformula X i , Yi and (◦| P pi → Q pi ) in (28).
And, of course, for any (such sub)formula E ,Al ` ◦| E → E and hence `` ◦| E → E . Therefore, starting from |H (28)◦
and applying Lemma 3.5 k + k + nk times, we infer that |H (29)◦. But (29) is a disabbreviation of (22), and thus the
desired |H (22)◦ holds. 
9. Main lemma
Lemma 9.1. Assume G ⇒ K is a standard Int-sequent, K is a Kripke model of size n with K ||≡ G and K /||≡W, and
D is the n-desequentization of G ⇒ W. Then D is not valid; specifically, there is an interpretation ◦ of complexityunionsqΣ B1 such that 6|H D◦.
The present long section is entirely devoted to a proof of this lemma. It will be seen in the last, very short section of
this paper that Lemma 9.1, in combination with some earlier-proven lemmas, almost immediately implies the sought
completeness of Int with respect to the semantics of computability logic.
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9.1. Main claim
Let us get started with our proof of Lemma 9.1. We pick and fix an arbitrary standard Int-sequent
X1 ◦– (Y1 ◦– Z1 unionsq T1), . . . , Xk ◦– (Yk ◦– Zk unionsq Tk),
(P1 ◦– Q1) ◦– R1, . . . , (Pk ◦– Qk) ◦– Rk
}
⇒ W (30)
abbreviated as G ⇒ W , a Kripke model K = (W,R, |≡ ) of size n and assume that K ||≡ G and K /||≡W . Let us agree
for the rest of this section that:
• j exclusively ranges over 1, . . . , k;
• i exclusively ranges over 1, . . . , 2k;
• p, q exclusively range over 1, . . . , n;
• w, u exclusively range over bit strings.
Next, for each j and p, we let
P pj = Pj and Q pj = Q j .
Then the n-desequentization of (30) is
◦|
(
X1 ∧ Y1 → Z1 unionsq T1
) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (Xk ∧ Yk → Zk unionsq Tk) ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P11 → Q11) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pn1 → Qn1) → R1
) ∧ · · · ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P1k → Q1k) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| Pnk → Qnk ) → Rk
)
.
→ W. (31)
Thus, our goal is to find a counterinterpretation (of complexity unionsqΣ B1 ) for the formula (31), with a
counterinterpretation here meaning an interpretation ◦ such that 6|H (31)◦.
Remember, from Section 7 of [15], the distinction between general and elementary letters (=atoms when 0-ary).
Elementary letters are to be interpreted as predicates, while general letters can be interpreted as arbitrary static games.
The atoms of the languages of Int and Al, as we know, are general rather than elementary. However, when it comes
to interpretations, formulas with only elementary letters — called elementary-base formulas — are both technically
and intuitively easier to deal with than those with general letters. For this reason, we are going to replace (31) with
the elementary-base — though no longer propositional — formula (32) of the same form as (31), and then construct
a counterinterpretation for (32) rather than (31).
In particular, for each (general, 0-ary) nonlogical atom A of the language of Int, we fix a unique 1-ary elementary
letter A˙ — unique in the sense that whenever A 6= B, we also have A˙ 6= B˙. We also fix a variable x and, for each
atom A of the language of Int, agree on the abbreviation A˘ defined by
A˘ = unionsqx A˙(x).
Now, the above-mentioned elementary-base formula (32) is simply obtained from (31) through replacing every atom
A by A˘:
◦|
(
X˘1 ∧ Y˘1 → Z˘1 unionsq T˘1
) ∧ · · · ∧ ◦| (X˘k ∧ Y˘k → Z˘k unionsq T˘k) ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P˘11 → Q˘11) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘n1 → Q˘n1) → R˘1
) ∧ · · · ∧
◦|
(
(◦| P˘1k → Q˘1k) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nk → Q˘nk ) → R˘k
)
.
→ W˘ . (32)
The language in which (32) is written is a sublanguage of the otherwise more expressive first-order language of
Section 7 of [15]. Specifically, every atom of this sublanguage is nonlogical, elementary and 1-ary, and the only
variable that may occur in formulas is x . Hence, the meanings of the terms “(admissible) interpretation”, “valid” and
“uniformly valid”, when used in this new context, should be understood as defined in [15] which, of course, are fully
consistent with the meanings of these terms as (re)defined in the previous sections of this paper for the languages of
Int and Al. For simplicity, we agree that, in contexts dealing with (32), by just “interpretation” we always mean (32)-
admissible interpretation (all but some pathological interpretations would be automatically (32)-admissible, anyway).
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And let us agree to say that such an interpretation ? is of complexity Σ B1 iff, for every atom A of the language of Int,
the game A˙?(x) is in Σ B1 (see Section 2.4).
We label the following statement and subsequent similar statements “claims” rather than “lemmas” because they
are true only in our particular context, set by the assumptions that we have already made within the present proof of
Lemma 9.1.
Claim 9.2. There is an interpretation ? of complexity Σ B1 such that 6|H (32)?.
Before we attempt to prove Claim 9.2, let us see that it implies the main Lemma 9.1. According to this claim,
we have 6|H (32)?, where ? is a certain interpretation sending every atom of (32) to a Boolean combination of Σ1-
predicates. Let now ◦ be the interpretation that sends every atom A of the language of Int to A˘?. It is easy to see that
then (31)◦ = (32)?, so that 6|H (31)◦. And clearly ◦ is of the desired complexityunionsqΣ B1 , because A◦ = A˘? = unionsqx A˙?(x).
As (31) is the n-desequentization of (30), we find Lemma 9.1 proven.
So, the “only” remaining duty within our proof of the main Lemma 9.1 is to prove Claim 9.2. The rest of this
section is solely devoted to that task.
9.2. Terminology and notation
Note that, since each atom of (32) is to be interpreted as an elementary game, the structure (Lr component) of the
game (32)? does not depend on the selection of an interpretation ?. This nice property of elementary-base formulas
was one of our reasons for choosing to deal with (32) instead of (31). In many contexts, it allows us to terminologically
treat (32) as if it was a game, even though, strictly speaking, it is just a formula, and becomes a game only after an
interpretation is applied to it. Namely, we can and will unambiguously say “legal run of (32)”, meaning “legal run of
(32)? for some (= every) interpretation ?”.
We will often need to differentiate between subformulas of (31) or (32) and particular occurrences of such. It should
be remembered that the expressions “P pj ”, “P˘
p
j ”, “X˘ j∧Y˘ j”, etc. are metaexpressions, denoting subformulas of (31) or
(32). As it happens, for different occurrences of subformulas of (31) or (32) we have chosen different metaexpressions,
so those occurrences can be safely identified with the corresponding metaexpressions. To avoid possible notational
confusions, we will write “bP pj c”, “bP˘ pj c”, “bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ jc”, etc. to indicate that we meanmetaexpressions (= particular
occurrences of subformulas) rather than the formulas for which those expressions stand. So, say, when we write
X˘ i = X˘ j or X˘ i = Z˘ j , we mean that X˘ i and X˘ j , or X˘ i and Z˘ j , are identical as formulas; on the other hand, by writing
bX˘ ic = bX˘ jc we will mean that the two metaexpressions “X˘ i” and “X˘ j” are graphically identical, i.e., that X˘ i and
X˘ j stand for the same occurrence of the same subformula of (32), which implies that i = j . And, as the expressions
“X˘” and “Z˘” are graphically different from each other, we would never have bX˘ ic = bZ˘ jc, no matter what i and j
are.
Consider any particular legal position or run Γ of (32). Since (32) is a→-combination of games, every move of Γ
has the form 1.α or 2.α. Intuitively, 1.α means the move α made in the antecedent of (32), and 2.α the move α made in
the consequent. Correspondingly, we think of Γ as consisting of two subruns which, using the notational conventions
of Subsection 4.3 of [15], are denoted by Γ 1. and Γ 2.. We will be referring to Γ 2. as the Γ -residual position of bW˘c,
because, intuitively, Γ 2. is what remains of Γ after discarding in it everything but the part that constitutes a run in the
bW˘c component of (32). Note that we wrote bW˘c here. Using just W˘ instead could have been ambiguous, for W˘ , as a
formula, may (and probably does) have many occurrences in (32), while bW˘c refers to the occurrence of that formula
in the consequent and only there. Also, we said “position” rather than “run”. It is safe to do so because Γ 2., which has
to be a legal run of the game W˘ = unionsqxW˙ (x) (for otherwise Γ would not be a legal run of (32)), contains at most one
labmove — namely, it is 〈〉 or 〈>a〉 for some constant a.
As for Γ 1., it is a legal run of the negation of the antecedent of (32) rather than the antecedent itself. That is so
because, as we remember, a game A → B is defined as¬A∨B. And this means nothing but that¬Γ 1. is a legal run of
the antecedent of (32). Accordingly, we will be interested in ¬Γ 1. rather than Γ 1., because we find it more convenient
to see the antecedent of (32) as it is, without a negation. The antecedent of (32), in turn, is a ∧-conjunction, and we
think of ¬Γ 1. as consisting of as many subruns as the number of conjuncts. Namely, each such subrun is ¬Γ 1.i. for
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some i . If here i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we call ¬Γ 1.i. the Γ -residual run of b◦| (X˘ i ∧ Y˘i → Z˘i unionsq T˘i )c, and if i = k + j , we
call ¬Γ 1.i. the Γ -residual run of
b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c.
As in the case of bW˘c, such names correspond to the intuitive meanings of ¬Γ 1.i.. For example, where 1 ≤ j ≤ k,
¬Γ 1. j. can be characterized as the part of Γ that constitutes a run in the b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c component. Such a
run should be a legal run of the game (represented by) ◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j ), for otherwise Γ would not be a legal
run of (32).
Assume Ψ is the Γ -residual run of b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c. We will be referring to the bitstring tree
Tree◦| (X˘ j∧Y˘ j→Z˘ junionsqT˘ j )〈Ψ 〉 (see Subsection 4.6 of [15]) as the Γ -residual b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree. Intuitively, this
is the underlying BT structure of the subrun of Γ that is taking place in the b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c component of
(32). Then the run Ψ is further thought of as consisting of multiple legal runs of X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j , specifically, the
run Ψw (again, see Subsection 4.6 of [15]) for each complete branch w of the Γ -residual b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-
tree. Notice that such a Ψw, as a legal run of X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j , would be finite, containing at most 4 labmoves.
Hence we can refer to it as “position” rather than “run”. We call such a position Ψw the Γ -residual position of
bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. The Γ -residual
b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree
and the Γ -residual run of
b((◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw
(where w is a complete branch of that tree) are defined similarly. In this case, for safety, we say run rather than
position, for the game (represented by) (◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j is not finite-depth because of its
◦| P˘ pj -components, and hence the corresponding Ψw may be infinite.
Assume w is a complete branch of the Γ -residual b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, and Θ is the Γ -residual position
of bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. Such a Θ is thought of as consisting of two subpositions: ¬Θ1. and Θ2.. We respectively
refer to these as the Γ -residual position of bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ jcw and the Γ -residual position of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. In turn, ¬Θ1.
is further seen as consisting of two subpositions ¬Θ1.1. and ¬Θ1.2., to which we respectively refer as the Γ -residual
position of bX˘ jcw and the Γ -residual position of bY˘ jcw. Similarly, if w is a complete branch of the Γ -residual
b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree and Θ is the Γ -residual run of
b(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw,
we respectively refer to
1.¬Θ1.,
2.Θ2.,
3.¬Θ1.p.,
4.Θ1.p.1. and
5.¬Θ1.p.2.
as the Γ -residual runs of
1. b(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj )cw,
2. bR˘ jcw,
3. b◦| P˘ pj → Q˘ pj cw,
4. b◦| P˘ pj cw and
5. bQ˘ pj cw,
G. Japaridze / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 147 (2007) 187–227 215
respectively (in the cases of bR˘ jcw and bQ˘ pj cw we can always say “position” instead of “run”, of course).
Assumew is a complete branch of the Γ -residual b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j )∧· · ·∧(◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree, andΥ is the
Γ -residual run of b◦| P˘ pj cw. We call Tree◦
| P˘ pj 〈Υ 〉 the Γ -residual b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree. Υ is then further seen as consisting of
multiple legal positions of P˘ pj , specifically, the position Υ
u for each complete branch u of the Γ -residual b◦| P˘ pj cw-
tree. We refer to such a position Υu as the Γ -residual position of bP˘ pj cwu .
In the above terminological conventions we have started writing “bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ jcw”, “bP˘ pj cwu ”, etc. Formally these, just
like simply “bX˘ i ∧ Y˘ic” or “bP˘ic”, are metaexpressions. If, say, we write bX˘ icw = bX˘ jcu , we imply that the two
components are graphically the same, here meaning that i = j and w = u. Note that such metaexpressions would
not always be finite. For instance, bX˘ icw would be infinite if the bitstring w is so; this, however, can only be the case
when Γ is an infinite run.
What we call the residual molecules of Γ , or simply Γ -molecules, are the following metaexpressions:
• bW˘c;
• bX˘ jcw, bY˘ jcw and bZ˘ j unionsqT jcw for each j and each complete branch w of the Γ -residual b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-
tree.
• bQ˘ pj cw and bR˘ jcw for each j , p and each complete branch w of the Γ -residual b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj →
Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree.
• bP˘ pj cwu for each j, p, each complete branchw of the Γ -residual b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j )∧· · ·∧(◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree
and each complete branch u of the Γ -residual b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree.
We may say just “molecule” instead of “Γ -molecule” when Γ is fixed in a given context or is irrelevant.
We say that the types of the above 7 sorts of molecules are W , X j , Y j , Z j unionsq T j , Q j , R j and Pj , respectively.
When irrelevant, the index j can be omitted here. We differentiate between types and what we call metatypes. The
metatype of bW˘c is the metaexpression bWc; the metatype of bP˘ pj cwu is the metaexpression bP pj c; the metatype of
bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is the metaexpression bZ j unionsq T jc; the metatype of bX˘ jcw is the metaexpression bX jc, and similarly for
bY˘ jcw, bQ˘ pj cw, bR˘ jcw. As in the case of types, the indices j and/or p can be omitted here when irrelevant. Notice that
if two molecules have different types, then they also have different metatypes, but not vice versa: for instance, bX˘ jcw
and bY˘ jcv would always have different metatypes (because “X”6=“Y ”), but their types may be identical, meaning that
so are the atoms of (31) for the occurrences of which X j and Y j stand. And, where q 6= p, the two molecules bQ pj cw
and bQqj cw would always have identical types but different metatypes.bWc-, bXc-, bY c- and bQc-metatype molecules are said to be positive; and bZ unionsq T c-, bRc- and bPc-metatype
molecules are said to be negative. When one of two molecules M1,M2 is positive and the other is negative, we say
that M1 and M2 have opposite genders. Mark the fact that, for a Γ -residual molecule M , the Γ -residual position of
M is always 〈〉 or 〈>a〉 for some constant a unless M is bZ unionsq T c-metatype, in which case the Γ -residual position of
M is always 〈〉, 〈>d〉 or 〈>d,>a〉 for some constant a and some d ∈ {1, 2}. Note that here, when M is negative, the
moves (if any) are made by player ⊥ even though they are >-labeled.
Let M be a Γ -molecule, and Φ the Γ -residual position of M . To what we will be referring as the content of M in
Γ , or the Γ -content of M , or the content of M as a Γ -residual molecule, or — when Γ is clear from the context or
is irrelevant — simply the content of M , is the formula C such that:
• If the type of M is A with A ∈ {W, X j , Y j , Q j , R j , Pj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, then:
– if Φ = 〈〉, then C = unionsqx A˙(x);
– if Φ = 〈>a〉, then C = A˙(a).
• If the type of M is Z j unionsq T j , then:
– if Φ = 〈〉, then C = unionsqx Z˙ j (x) unionsqunionsqx T˙ j (x);
– if Φ = 〈>1〉, then C = unionsqx Z˙ j (x);
– if Φ = 〈>1,>a〉, then C = Z˙ j (a);
– if Φ = 〈>2〉, then C = unionsqx T˙ j (x);
– if Φ = 〈>2,>a〉, then C = T˙ j (a).
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Note that two molecules may have identical contents even if their metatypes (but not types!) are different.
Let M be a Γ -residual molecule, and C its content in Γ . We say that M , as a Γ -residual molecule (or in Γ ) is:
• grounded iff C is of the form A˙(a) (some constant a and atom A of (30));
• unionsqx-contentual iff C is of the formunionsqx A˙(x);
• unionsq-contentual iff C is of the formunionsqx A˙(x) unionsqunionsqx B˙(x).
Intuitively, the content of a given Γ -molecule M is the game to which the corresponding subgame of (32) has
evolved as a result of the moves of Γ made within the M component. For example, for the molecule bW˘c, beingunionsqx-
contentual means that the moves of Γ have not affected this component, so that, as a (sub)game, it remainsunionsqxW˙ (x);
and being grounded means that the moves of Γ — in fact, one of such moves — has brought the gameunionsqxW˙ (x) down
to W˙ (a) for some constant a. Similarly for molecules whose metatypes are bXc, bY c, bPc, bQc, bRc. On the other
hand, for bZ unionsqT c-metatype molecules, it is being unionsq-contentual rather thanunionsqx-contentual that means not having been
affected by the moves of Γ .
We say that a Γ -molecule M1 ismatchingly grounded (in Γ ) iff M1 is grounded and there is another grounded Γ -
molecule M2 such that M1 and M2 have opposite genders but identical contents. If M1 is grounded but not matchingly
so, then we say that it is non-matchingly grounded.
Note that, for a Γ -residual molecule M , the content of M , as well as whether M is (matchingly) grounded, unionsqx-
contentual or unionsq-contentual, depends on Γ . That is why, unless Γ is fixed or clear from the context, for safety we should
say “the content of M in Γ ” instead of just “the content of M”, say “M is grounded in Γ ” or “M , as a Γ -molecule,
is grounded” instead of just “M is grounded”, etc. The point is that the same metaexpression M can be a residual
molecule of two different runs. Relevant to our interests are only the cases when one run, say Γ1, is an initial segment
of the other run, say Γ2. Assume this is so for the rest of the present paragraph, and assume M is a Γ1-molecule. If
M = bW˘c, M will also be a Γ2-molecule. It is possible, however, that M is unionsqx-contentual in Γ1 while grounded in
Γ2; and if so, the content of M in Γ1 will be different from that in Γ2. And it is also generally possible that M is non-
matchingly grounded in Γ1 while matchingly grounded in Γ2. Similarly when the metatype of M is anything other
than bWc. However, when M is a non-bWc-metatype Γ1-molecule such as, say, bX˘ jcw, then there is no guarantee that
M is also a Γ2-molecule. For instance, if (Γ2 6= Γ1 and) in position Γ1 the player > made a replicative move in the
b◦| (X˘ j∧Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c component of the game which split (i.e. extended tow0 andw1) the leafw of the Γ1-residual
b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, then w would be just an internal node rather than a complete branch of the Γ2-residual
b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, meaning that M = bX˘ jcw is not a residual molecule of Γ2. Instead of bX˘ jcw, in the
general case, Γ2 could have many residual molecules of the form bX˘ jcw′ , where w  w′. Let us agree to say about
each such Γ2-molecule bX˘ jcw′ that it descends from bX˘ jcw, or that bX˘ jcw is the Γ1-predecessor — or simply a
predecessor if we do not care about details — of bX˘ jcw′ . Similarly for the cases when M is bY˘ jcw, bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw,
bQ˘ pj cw or bR˘ jcw. And rather similarly for the case M = bP˘ pj cwu : in this case M will be said to be the Γ1-predecessor
(or just a predecessor) of every Γ2-molecule bP˘ pj cw
′
u′ such that w  w′ and u  u′; and, correspondingly, every such
bP˘ pj cw
′
u′ will be said to descend from bP˘ pj cwu . Extending this terminology to the remaining case of M = bW˘c, the
latter is always its own (single) descendant and predecessor.
Here comes some more terminology. In the context of a given legal position Γ of (32), where M is aunionsqx-contentual
Γ -molecule, to ground M intuitively means to make a (legal) move that makes M grounded; we say that such a move
is patient if M is the only molecule whose content it modifies. Informally speaking, a patient move for a non-
bWc-metatype molecule M means that the move is made in the corresponding leaf (or two nested leaves if M is
bPc-metatype) rather than internal node(s) of the corresponding underlying BT(s), for a move in an internal node v
would simultaneously affect several molecules — all those that are associated with leaves r such that v  r . In precise
terms, we have:
• To ground bW˘c means to make the move 2.a for some constant a. This sort of a move is automatically patient.
• To ground bX˘ jcw (resp. bY˘ jcw, resp. bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw) means to make the move 1. j.w′.1.1.a (resp. 1. j.w′.1.2.a, resp.
1. j.w′.2.a) for some bitstring w′  w and some constant a. Such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To ground bR˘ jcw means to make the move 1.i.w′.2.a for i = k + j , some bitstring w′  w and some constant a.
Again, such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
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• To ground bQ˘ pj cw means to make the move 1.i.w′.1.p.2.a for i = k+ j , some bitstring w′  w and some constant
a. Again, such a move is patient iff w′ = w.
• To ground bP˘ pj cwu means to make the move 1.i.w′.1.p.1.u′.a for i = k + j , some bitstrings w′  w and u′  u,
and some constant a. Such a move patient iff both w′ = w and u′ = u.
Notice that player > can only ground positive molecules, while player ⊥ can only ground negative molecules.
Every grounding move thus has the form α.a for some constant a. Let us call such a constant a the choice constant of
the grounding move. Then we say that a given act (move) of grounding is done diversifyingly iff the move is patient,
and its choice constant is the smallest constant that has never been used before in the play (run) as the choice constant
of some grounding move.
Only unionsqx-contentual molecules can be grounded. As for unionsq-contentual molecules, before they can be grounded,
they should be dedisjunctionized. That is, a move should be made that changes their status from unionsq-contentual tounionsqx-contentual. Precisely, for a unionsq-contentual molecule bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw, such a move is 1. j.w.2.1 or 1. j.w.2.2.6 The effect
of the move 1. j.w.2.1 is turning the molecule’s content unionsqx Z˙ j (x) unionsqunionsqx T˙ j (x) into unionsqx Z˙ j (x), and therefore we say
“to Z -dedisjunctionize” for making such a dedisjunctionizing move. And the effect of the move 1. j.w.2.2 is turning
the molecule’s content intounionsqx T˙ j (x), so we say “to T -dedisjunctionize” is this case. Note that, since bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is
negative, it can only be dedisjunctionized by player ⊥, even though (or therefore), in the resulting position, the move
1. j.w.2.1 or 1. j.w.2.2 will be >-labeled.
As before, assume Γ is a (context-setting) legal run of (32). By a Γ -supermolecule we mean a grounded residual
molecule M of some subposition (i.e. a finite initial segment) Φ of Γ such that for no proper initial segment Ψ of Φ
is the Ψ -predecessor of M grounded. We refer to such a Φ as the position of grounding of M , and refer to the length
of Φ as the time of grounding of M .
Obviously any grounded residual molecule M (of Γ or any of its initial segments) descends from some unique
supermolecule. We call the supermolecule from which M descends the essence of M . Every supermolecule is thus
its own essence. Only grounded molecules have essences. Therefore, if we say “the essence of M”, the claim that M
is grounded is automatically implied. Whether a grounded molecule M is a supermolecule or not, by the position of
grounding and time of grounding of M we mean those of the essence of M . Intuitively, the position of grounding of
such an M is the position in which M — more precisely, a predecessor of M — first became grounded, and the time
of grounding tells us how soon after the start of the play this happened. Mark the obvious fact that the content of any
grounded molecule is the same as that of the essence of that molecule.
We define a Γ -chain as any nonempty finite sequence 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 of Γ -supermolecules such that:
1. M1 and only M1 is bPc-metatype.
2. For each odd k with 1 ≤ k < m, Mk is negative, Mk+1 is positive, and the two supermolecules have identical
contents.
3. For each odd k with 3 ≤ k ≤ m, we have:
• if Mk = bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ cw (some j, w), then Mk−1 is the essence of bX˘ jcw or the essence of bY˘ jcw;
• if Mk = bR˘ jcw (some j, w), then Mk−1 is the essence of bQ˘ pj cw for some p ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We will simply say “chain” instead of “Γ -chain” when Γ is fixed or irrelevant. As an aside, observe that, according
to the above definition, if bW˘c is in a chain, then it can only be the last element of the chain, and such a chain is of an
even length. All internal (neither the first nor the last) odd-numbered elements of a chain have the metatype bZ unionsq T c
or bRc, and all internal even-numbered elements have the metatype bXc, bY c or bQc.
When C = 〈M1, . . . ,Mm〉 is a chain, we say that C hits Mm , and that C originates from M1, or that M1 is the
origin of C .
We say that a chain C is open iff, where bP pj c is the metatype of the origin of C , no element of C has the metatype
bQ pj c (for the same j, p).
Where Γ (as before) is a legal run of (32) and M is a Γ -supermolecule, by the Γ -base of M we mean the set of all
worlds p ∈ W such that there is an open Γ -chain hitting M whose origin is of the metatype bP pj c for some j (and
that very p). If M is a grounded Γ -molecule but not necessarily a supermolecule, then the Γ -base of M is defined as
the Γ -base of the essence of M . In contexts where Γ is fixed, we denote the Γ -base of M by Base(M).
6 Well, just as in the case of grounding, the moves 1. j.w′.2.1 or 1. j.w′.2.2, where w′  w (rather than necessarily w′ = w) would achieve the
same “dedisjunctionizing” effect; however, we do not consider such cases as they are never going to really emerge in our construction.
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9.3. The counterstrategy
In this subsection we set up a counterstrategy for (32) in the form of an EPM E , which will act in the role of ⊥ in a
play over (32). E is a universal counterstrategy for (32), in the sense that, as will be shown later, no HPM wins (32)?
against this particular, one-for-all EPM for the yet-to-be-constructed interpretation ?. Since E plays as ⊥ rather than
>, we will be interested in the run cospelled rather than spelled by any given computation branch of E . That is, in a
play, the moves made by E get the label ⊥, and the moves made by its adversary get the label >. In our description
of E and the further analysis of its behavior, as we did in earlier sections, we will be relying on the clean environment
assumption, here meaning that the adversary of a E never makes illegal moves. From the definition of E it will be also
immediately clear that E itself does not make any illegal moves either. Since all runs that E generates are thus legal,
we usually omit the word “legal”, and by a run or position we will always mean a legal run or position of (32).
The work of E consists in sequentially performing the first two or all three (depending on how things evolve) of
the following procedures FIRST, SECOND and THIRD. In the descriptions of these procedures, “current” should
be understood as Φ-residual, where Φ is the position of the play at the time when a given step is performed. This
word may be omitted, and by just saying “molecule” we mean current molecule. Similarly, “unionsq-contentual”, “unionsqx-
contentual”, “(matchingly) grounded”, “to ground”, etc. should be understood in the context of the then-current
position. Similarly, for a grounded molecule M , Base(M) means the Φ-base of M , where Φ is the then-current
position. Also, since the current position is always a position (finite run), it is safe to say “leaf” instead of “complete
branch” when talking about bitstring trees in our description of the work of E .
PROCEDURE FIRST: Diversifyingly ground all bPc-metatype molecules, and go to SECOND.
PROCEDURE SECOND: If bW˘c is matchingly grounded, go to THIRD. Else perform each of the following
routines:
Routine 1. For each j and each leaf w of the current b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, whenever both bX˘ jcw and
bY˘ jcw are matchingly grounded and bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is unionsq-contentual, do the following:
(i): if p |≡ Z for every world p such that p is accessible from each element of Base(bX˘ jcw) ∪ Base(bY˘ jcw), then
Z -dedisjunctionize bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw, after which diversifyingly ground (the nowunionsqx-contentual) bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw;
(ii): else T -dedisjunctionize bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw, after which diversifyingly ground (the nowunionsqx-contentual) bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw.
Routine 2. For each j and each leafw of the current b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j )∧· · ·∧(◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree, whenever
each bQ˘ pj cw (1 ≤ p ≤ n) is matchingly grounded and bR˘ jcw isunionsqx-contentual, diversifyingly ground bR˘ jcw.
Routine 3. Grant permission, and repeat SECOND.
PROCEDURE THIRD:
Step 1: Z -dedisjunctionize all (remaining) unionsq-contentual bZ unionsq T c-metatype molecules.
Step 2: Diversifyingly ground allunionsqx-contentual bZ unionsq T c- and bRc-metatype molecules.
Step 3: Go into an infinite loop within a permission state.
Remember that a fair EPM is one whose every e-computation branch (any valuation e) is fair, i.e. permission is
granted infinitely many times in each branch. Before we go any further, let us make the straightforward observation
that
E is a fair EPM. (33)
This is so because THIRD grants permission infinitely many times within Step 3, and if THIRD is never reached by
E , then SECOND will be iterated infinitely many times, with each iteration granting permission within Routine 3.
Our ultimate goal is to show that (32) is not valid, which, as mentioned, will be achieved by finding an interpretation
? such that no HPM wins (32)? against E . We approach this goal by first proving the weaker fact that (32) is not
uniformly valid. In particular, below we are going to show that, for any valuation e and any e-computation branch
B of E , there is an interpretation Ď such that the run cospelled by B is a ⊥-won run of (32)Ď. As will be observed
at the beginning of Section 9.6, this fact immediately implies the non-uniform-validity of (32). Such a B-depending
counterinterpretation is going to be what in [11] is called perfect, in our particular case meaning that for any predicate
letter A˙ of (32), A˙Ď(x) is a finitary predicate that does not depend on any variables except x . This can be easily
seen to make A˘Ď and hence (32)Ď a constant game, allowing us to safely ignore the valuation parameter e in most
contexts, which is irrelevant because neither the game e[ A˘Ď] nor (notice) the work of E depends on e. To define such
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an interpretation, it is sufficient to indicate what constant atomic formulas are made by it true and what constant atomic
formulas are made false. Here and later, for simplicity, by “constant atomic formulas” we mean formulas of the form
A˙(a), where A˙ is a predicate letter occurring in (32) and a is a constant. For obvious reasons, how Ď interprets any
other atoms is irrelevant, and we may safely pretend that such atoms simply do not exist in the language.
So, fix any valuation e spelled on the valuation tape of E , and any e-computation branch B of E . Let Γ be the run
cospelled by B. Let us agree to say “ultimate” (run, position, tree) for “Γ -residual” (run, position, tree). To Γ itself
we refer as the ultimate run of b(32)c, or simply the ultimate run. By just saying “molecule” we mean a residual
molecule of Γ or of any initial segment of it. And Γ -molecules we call ultimate molecules. Any molecule would
thus be an ultimate molecule or a predecessor of such. When M is an ultimate molecule, by just saying that M is unionsq-
or unionsqx-contentual, grounded or matchingly grounded we mean that M is so in Γ . Also, “chain” now always means
Γ -chain, and, for any grounded molecule M , Base(M) means the Γ -base of M .
We will say that the branch B is short iff, in the process of playing it up, E never entered the THIRD stage, thus
forever remaining in SECOND. Otherwise B is long. The scope of all this B- and Γ -dependent terminology and
conventions extends to the following two subsections, throughout which B and Γ are fixed.
Our construction of a counterinterpretation for (32) depends on whether B is short or long. We consider these two
cases separately.
9.4. Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is short
Assume B is short. This, looking at the first line of the description of SECOND, means that, in the ultimate run of
b(32)c (in Γ , that is), W˘ is not matchingly grounded. We select our
counterinterpretation Ď
to be the perfect interpretation that makes the contents of all positive non-matchingly grounded ultimate molecules
false, and all other constant atomic formulas true.
Convention 9.3.
• Where A˙ is a predicate letter of (32) and a is any constant, we say that A˙(a) is true iff A˙Ď(a) is true.
• We say that b(32)c is true iff the ultimate run of b(32)c is a >-won run of (32)Ď.
• We say that bW˘c is true iff the ultimate position of bW˘c is a >-won position of W˘ Ď.
• We say that b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c is true iff the ultimate run of b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c is a >-won run of(
◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )
)Ď. Similarly for b◦| ((◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j )c.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, we say that bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is true iff
the ultimate run (position) of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is a >-won run of (Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )Ď. Similarly for bX˘ jcw, bY˘ jcw, bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ jcw,
bQ˘ pj cw, bR˘ jcw, b◦| P˘ pj → Q˘ jcw.
• Where w is a complete branch of the ultimate b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → Z˘ j
)c-tree and u is a
complete branch of the ultimate b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree, we say that bP˘ pj cwu is true iff the ultimate position of bP˘ pj cwu is a
>-won position of (P˘j )Ď.
“False” will mean “not true”.
Based on the definitions of unionsq andunionsq, with a moment’s thought we can see that the following claim is valid:
Claim 9.4. Let M be an arbitrary ultimate molecule.
(i) If M is unionsq- orunionsqx-contentual, then M is false.
(ii) If M is grounded, then M is true iff its content is true.
Our goal is to show that b(32)c is false. Throughout the rest of this subsection, we agree to understand the terms
“grounded”, “unionsqx-contentual”, etc. in the context of the ultimate run.
Note that bW˘c is guaranteed to be false. Indeed, if bW˘c is unionsqx-contentual, it is false by clause (i) of Claim 9.4.
And, if bW˘c is grounded, then, as no switch to THIRD has occurred, bW˘c must be non-matchingly grounded. Then,
with clause (ii) of Claim 9.4 in mind, bW˘c can be seen to be false by our choice of Ď.
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As bW˘c is false, in order to show that b(32)c is false, it would suffice to verify that, for each j , both b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j →
Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c and b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c are true. Why this would suffice can be seen directly
from the definitions of ∧ and →. In turn, based on the definition of ◦| , the truth of b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c and
b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c means nothing but that:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree, b(◦| P˘1j →
Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw is true.
Pick any j , and assume w is as in (a). If bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is grounded, then, with Claim 9.4(ii) in mind, it is true. This
is so because, by our choice of Ď, only the contents of positive non-matchingly grounded (ultimate) molecules are
made false by this interpretation; bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is not positive, nor is its content the same as that of some positive non-
matchingly grounded ultimate molecule, for then that molecule would not be non-matchingly grounded. The truth of
bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw, in turn, by the definition of→, can be seen to imply the truth of bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. Suppose now
bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is not grounded. Analyzing how E acts in Routine 1 of SECOND, this fact can be seen to indicate that at
least one of the two ultimate molecules bX˘ jcw and bY˘ jcw — let us assume it is bX˘ jcw — is not matchingly grounded.
If bX˘ jcw isunionsqx-contentual, it is false as are allunionsqx-contentual molecules. And if bX˘ jcw is non-matchingly grounded,
it is again false by our choice of Ď. In either case bX˘ jcw is thus false and hence, as can be seen from the definition of
∧, so is bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ jcw. This, in turn, by the definition of→, makes bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw true. Statement (a) is taken
care of.
Assume now w is as in (b). If bR˘ jcw is grounded, then we are done for the same reasons as in the previous
paragraph when discussing the similar case for bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. Suppose now bR˘ jcw is unionsqx-contentual. Reasoning as
we did in the corresponding case of the previous paragraph for “bX˘ jcw or bY˘ jcw” (only appealing to Routine 2
of SECOND instead of Routine 1), we find that, for some p, bQ˘ pj cw is false. Therefore, in order to conclude that
b(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw is true, it would be sufficient to show that b◦| P˘ pj cw is true. The truth
of b◦| P˘ pj cw means nothing but that, for every complete branch u of the ultimate b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree, bP˘ pj cwu is true. But this
is indeed so. Consider any complete branch u of the ultimate b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree. bP˘ pj cwu is grounded due to the actions of
E during FIRST. And, as this molecule is negative, it can be seen to be true by our choice of Ď. Statement (b) is thus
also taken care of.
So, b(32)c is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (32)Ď, i.e.Wn(32)Ď〈Γ 〉 = ⊥.
9.5. Constructing a counterinterpretation when B is long
Throughout this subsection, we assume B is long, i.e., at some point of playing B up, E switched from SECOND
to THIRD. This means that bW˘c is matchingly grounded in the ultimate run Γ . We let ∆ denote the (finite) initial
segment of Γ consisting of all of the (lab)moves made before the switch to THIRD occurred.
Throughout this subsection, Γ will remain the default, context-setting run for run-relative terminology and notation
such as “supermolecule”, “grounded”, “Base(M)”, etc.
Claim 9.5. No two different negative supermolecules have identical contents.
Proof. This is so because negative molecules are grounded by E , which always does grounding in a diversifying
way — in a way that ensures that the content of the resulting molecule is different from that of any other grounded
molecule. 
The supermolecules whose position of termination is not longer than∆we call old-generation supermolecules. In
other words, old-generation supermolecules are those that became grounded while E was still working within FIRST
of SECOND.
We say that a supermolecule M is well-behaved iff, whenever there is an open chain hitting M and originating
from a bP pj c-metatype supermolecule, we have p |≡ Pj .
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Claim 9.6. Suppose M is a well-behaved negative old-generation supermolecule, A˙(a) is its content, and p is a world
accessible from every element of Base(M). Then p |≡ A.
Proof. Let M , A˙(a), p be as above, and let Φ be the position of grounding of M . Obviously it is sufficient to assume
here — and we will assume — that p is the R-smallest world accessible from every world of Base(M), in the sense
that, for any q ∈ W , if q is accessible from every element of Base(M), then q is also accessible from p. This means
that R is a linear order on Base(M) with p being its greatest element, or otherwise Base(M) is empty and p is the
root world 1. We proceed by induction on the time of grounding of M , i.e. the length of Φ. There are three cases to
consider, depending on the metatype of M .
Case 1: M is bPc-metatype, specifically, M = bP˘qj cw for some q, j, w. Then Base(M) = {q} and thus p = q
because, according to our assumptions, p is the R-smallest world accessible from every element of Base(M). And,
as M is well-behaved, we have p |≡ Pj .
Case 2: M is bZ unionsq T c-metatype, specifically, M = bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. Since M is second-generation, bX˘ jcw should
be matchingly grounded in Φ (in fact in a proper initial segment of Φ), for otherwise E would not have grounded
bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw. Let N be the essence of bX˘ jcw, and let L be the essence of a negative grounded Φ-molecule whose
content is the same as that of (bX˘ jcw and hence of) N . The time of grounding of (N and hence of) L is smaller than
that of M and thus, just like M , L is an old-generation supermolecule. Observe that every L-hitting open chain turns
into an M-hitting open chain after appending N and M to it. For this reason, Base(L) ⊆ Base(M) and, since p is
accessible from all elements of Base(M), so is it from all elements of Base(L). Also, as M is well-behaved, so is L .
Hence, by the induction hypothesis,
p |≡ X j . (34)
A similar argument convinces us that
p |≡ Y j . (35)
According to our original assumptions regarding K, every world forces every formula of the antecedent of (30). So,
p |≡ X j ◦– (Y j ◦– Z j unionsq T j ). This, together with (34) and (35), implies that p |≡ Z j unionsq T j . Therefore, either p |≡ Z j or
p |≡ T j . It is rather obvious that Base(M) = Base(bX jcw) ∪ Base(bY jcw). Keeping this fact in mind together with
our assumption that p is the R-smallest world accessible from all worlds of Base(M), and analyzing the work of E
within Routine 1 of SECOND, we find that, if p |≡ Z j , then A = Z j , so that p |≡ A; and if p /|≡ Z j and hence p |≡ T j ,
then A = T j , so that, again, p |≡ A. In either case we thus have p |≡ A, as desired.
Case 3: M is bRc-metatype, specifically, M = bR˘ jcw. Then, of course, A = R j . We want to show that
p |≡ Pj ◦– Q j , from which the desired p |≡ R j (i.e. p |≡ A) follows because, as noted in the previous case, every
formula of the antecedent of (30) is forced by p, including (Pj ◦– Q j ) ◦– R j .
For a contradiction, assume p /|≡ Pj ◦– Q j . Then there is a world q accessible from p such that q |≡ Pj and
q /|≡ Q j . From Routine 2 of SECOND we see that bQ˘qj cw should be matchingly grounded in the position preceding
Φ (otherwise E would not have grounded M in that position). Arguing for bQqj cw as we did in Case 2 for bX˘ jcw, we
find that there is a negative old-generation supermolecule L whose time of grounding is smaller than that of M and
whose content is the same as that of bQqj cw, so that the type of L is Q j . Note that every open chain C hitting L can
be extended to a chain hitting M by adding to C the essence of bQqj cw and then M ; such a chain will remain open
unless the origin of C was a bPqj c-metatype molecule. Therefore, remembering that q |≡ Pj , we find that Base(L) is
well-behaved, because so is Base(M). With the above observation in mind, we also find that q can be the only world
that is in Base(L) but not in Base(M). Hence, remembering that p is accessible from every element of Base(M) and
pRq , we find that q is accessible from every element of Base(L). All this allows us to apply the induction hypothesis
to q and L and infer that q |≡ Q j , which is a contradiction. 
Claim 9.7. There is an open chain hitting bW˘c.
Proof. Since B is long, bW˘c is matchingly grounded (already) in ∆, so bW˘c is an old-generation supermolecule. Let
N be a negative grounded ∆-molecule whose content is identical with that of bW˘c, and let M be the essence of N .
The type of (N and hence) M , of course, should be W . Remember our assumption that K /||≡W , i.e. 1 /|≡W . It implies
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that Base(M) 6= ∅, for otherwise — vacuously — M would be well-behaved and 1 be accessible from every element
of Base(M), whence, by Claim 9.6, we would have 1 |≡W . The fact that Base(M) is nonempty means that there is an
open chain hitting M . The result of adding bW˘c to that chain obviously remains an open chain. 
Let us select and fix some — say, lexicographically the smallest — open chain hitting bW˘c, and call it the master
chain. According to Claim 9.7, such a chain exists. Let us call the supermolecules that are in the master chainmaster
supermolecules.
Now we are ready to define the
counterinterpretation Ď.
We define it as the perfect interpretation that makes the content of each master supermolecule false, and makes all
other constant atomic formulas true.
In what follows, we fully adopt the terminology of Convention 9.3, with the only difference that now the underlying
interpretation Ď on which that terminology is based is Ď as defined in the present subsection rather than as defined in
Section 9.4. As in Section 9.4, our goal is to show that b(32)c is false.
That bW˘c is false is immediate from our choice of Ď. Hence, as in Section 9.4, in order to show that b(32)c is false,
it would suffice to verify that, for each j , we have:
(a) for every complete branch w of the ultimate b◦| (X˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ j )c-tree, bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is true, and
(b) for every complete branch w of the ultimate b◦|
(
(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ j
)c-tree, b(◦| P˘1j →
Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw is true.
Pick any j , and assume w is as in (a). bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is grounded at least due to the actions of E during THIRD (in
case it otherwise managed to stay non-grounded throughout SECOND). If the essence of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is not in the
master chain, then its content is true, because the latter, in view of Claim 9.5 and with a little thought, can be seen to
be different from the content of any master supermolecule, and, by our choice of Ď, this interpretation only falsifies
the contents of master supermolecules. In turn, from the truth of the content of the essence of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw and hence
the truth of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw we infer that bX˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is true. Suppose now the essence of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw is
in the master chain. Then, from the definition of chain and with some thought, we can see that either the essence of
bX˘ jcw or the essence of bY˘ jcw should be there, too. Specifically, such a supermolecule would be the one immediately
preceding the essence of bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw in the master chain. Hence, by our choice of Ď, either bX˘ jcw or bY˘ jcw is false,
which makes bZ˘ j ∧ Y˘ j → Z˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw true.
Assume now w is as in (b). As was the case with bZ˘ j unionsq T˘ jcw in the previous paragraph, bR jcw is grounded, and, if
its essence is not in the master chain, then its content and hence b(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j )∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw is true.
Suppose now the essence of bR˘ jcw is in the master chain. Arguing as we did in the previous case for bX˘ jcw or bY˘ jcw,
we find that, for some p, the essence of bQ˘ pj cw is a master supermolecule and hence bQ˘ pj cw is false. Therefore, in
order to conclude that b(◦| P˘1j → Q˘1j ) ∧ · · · ∧ (◦| P˘nj → Q˘nj ) → R˘ jcw true, it would suffice to show that b◦| P˘ pj cw is
true. The truth of b◦| P˘ pj cw means nothing but that, for every complete branch u of the ultimate b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree, bP˘ pj cwu
is true. But this is indeed so. Consider any complete branch u of the ultimate b◦| P˘ pj cw-tree. bP˘ pj cwu is grounded due
to the actions during FIRST. Its essence cannot be in the master chain because the essence of bQ˘ pj cw is there and
the master chain is open. But then, in view of Claim 9.5, the content of bP˘ pj cwu is different from that of any master
supermolecule, which, by our choice of Ď, makes bP˘ pj cwu true. Statement (b) is thus also taken care of.
So, b(32)c is false, meaning that Γ is a ⊥-won run of (32)Ď, i.e.Wn(32)Ď〈Γ 〉 = ⊥.
9.6. From non-uniform-validity to non-validity
In the previous two subsections we in fact showed that
(32) is not uniformly valid. (36)
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Indeed, suppose, for a contradiction, that (32) is uniformly valid. Let then H be a uniform HPM-solution for (32) —
an HPM that wins (32)∗ for every interpretation ∗. Pick an arbitrary valuation e (which is irrelevant here anyway),
and let B be the (E, e,H)-branch. As observed in (33), E is fair, so the conditions of Lemma 5.1 are met and such
a branch B is defined. Let then Ď be the interpretation constructed from B as in Section 9.4 or 9.5, depending on
whether B is short or long. Then, as we showed in those two subsections, the run Γ cospelled by B is a >-lost run
of (32)Ď (= e[(32)Ď], because the interpretation is perfect). But, by Lemma 5.1, the same Γ is a run spelled by some
e-computation branch ofH— specifically, it is theH vs. E run on e. This means thatH does not win (32)Ď, contrary
to our assumption thatH is a uniform solution for (32).
In turn, (36) can be eventually rather easily translated into the fact of completeness of Int with respect to uniform
validity.
Our goal, however, is to show the completeness of Int with respect to validity rather than just uniform validity
— the goal which, as we remember, has been reduced to showing the non-validity of (32). The fact of non-validity
of (32), of course, is stronger than the fact of its non-uniform-validity. The point is that the counterinterpretation Ď
constructed in Sections 9.4 and 9.5 depends on the computation branch B and hence on the HPMH that plays against
E . That is, different Hs could require different Ďs. In order to show that (32) is not valid, we need to construct a one,
common-for-all-H counterinterpretation ?, with the property that every HPM H loses (32)? against E for that very
interpretation ? on some valuation e. Not to worry, we can handle that.
Let us fix the sequence
H1, H2, H3, . . .
of all HPMs, enumerated according to the lexicographic order of their standardized descriptions. Next, we select a
variable z different from x and, for each constant c, define
ec
to be the valuation that sends z to c, and (arbitrarily) sends all other variables to 1.
For each constant c, let
Bc
be the (E, ec,Hc)-branch, and let
Γc
be the run cospelled by Bc, i.e. (by Lemma 5.1) theHc vs. E run on ec.
Next, for any constant c, let
Ěc
be the interpretation constructed from Bc and Γc in the way we constructed the interpretation Ď from B and Γ in:
Section 9.4 if Bc is short;
Section 9.5 if Bc is long.
From the results of Sections 9.4 and 9.5 we thus have:
For any constant c,Wn(32)
Ěc 〈Γc〉 = ⊥. (37)
Consider any atom A˙(x) of (32). For each particular constant c, the predicate A˙Ěc(x) is unary, depending only on x .
But if here c is seen as a variable and, as such, renamed into z, then the predicate becomes binary, depending on x and
z. Let us denote such a predicate by A¨(x, z). That is, we define A¨(x, z) as the predicate such that, for any constants a
and c,
A¨(a, c) = A˙Ěc(a).
We now define our ultimate
counterinterpretation ?
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by stipulating that, for any atom A˙(x) of (32),7 A˙?(x) is nothing but the above predicate A¨(x, z). Note that, unlike Ěc
(any particular constant c), ? is not a perfect interpretation, for A˙?(x) depends on the “hidden” variable z.
Claim 9.8. For any constant c, (32)Ěc = ec[(32)?].
Proof. Consider any predicate letter A˙ of (32), and any constant c. We claim that(unionsqx A˙(x))Ěc = ec[(unionsqx A˙(x))?]. (38)
The games on the two sides of the above equation can be rewritten as unionsqx A˙Ěc(x) and ec[unionsqx A˙?(x)], respectively.
ec[unionsqx A˙?(x)] can be further rewritten as ec[unionsqx A¨(x, z)]. Thus, in order to verify (38), we need to show that
unionsqx A˙Ěc(x) = ec[unionsqx A¨(x, z)]. (39)
As noted earlier, unionsqx A˙Ěc(x) is a constant game due to the fact that the interpretation Ěc is perfect. So, it is its own
instance, andunionsqx A˙Ěc(x) can be safely written instead of e[unionsqx A˙Ěc(x)] for whatever (irrelevant) valuation e. Of course,
the two games of (39) have the same legal runs, with every such run being 〈〉 or 〈>a〉 for some constant a. So, we
only need to verify that the Wn components of those two games are also identical. And, of course, considering only
legal runs when comparing the twoWn components is sufficient. Furthermore, the empty run is a ⊥-won run of both
games. So, we only need to focus on legal runs of length 1. Consider any such run 〈>a〉. By the definition of unionsq,
Wnunionsqx A˙Ěc(x)〈>a〉 = > iff Wn A˙Ěc(a)〈〉 = >; in turn, Wn A˙Ěc(a)〈〉 = > means nothing but that A˙Ěc(a) is true; and, by
the definition of A¨, A˙Ěc(a) = A¨(a, c). Thus,
Wnunionsqx A˙Ěc(x)〈>a〉 = > iff A¨(a, c) is true. (40)
Next, again by the definition ofunionsq, we have
Wnunionsqx A¨(x,z)ec 〈>a〉 =Wn A¨(a,z)ec 〈〉.
As A¨(a, z) only depends on z and ec sends this variable to c, we also have ec[ A¨(a, z)] = A¨(a, c). And, of course,
Wn A¨(a,c)〈〉 = > means nothing but that A¨(a, c) is true. So,
Wnunionsqx A¨(x,z)ec 〈>a〉 = > iff A¨(a, c) is true.
The above, together with (40), implies
Wnunionsqx A˙Ěc(x)〈>a〉 =Wnunionsqx A¨(x,z)ec 〈>a〉,
thus completing our proof of (39) and hence of (38).
Now, by induction, (38) extends from formulas of the form unionsqx A˙(x) to all more complex subformulas of (32)
including (32) itself, meaning that (32)Ěc = ec[(32)?]. The steps of this induction are straightforward, because each
of the operations ?, Ěc and ec[. . .] commutes with each of the connectives ∧, ◦| and→. 
Putting (37) and Claim 9.8 together, we find that, for any constant c, Γc is a⊥-won run of ec[(32)?]. Now, remember
that Γc is the Hc vs. E run on ec, according to Lemma 5.1 meaning that Γc is the run spelled by an ec-computation
branch ofHc. So, everyHc loses (32)? on valuation ec, i.e. noHc wins (32)?. But every HPM isHc for some c. Thus,
no HPM wins (32)?. In other words, (32) is not valid.
This almost completes our proof of the main Claim 9.2 and hence our proof of the main Lemma 9.1 and hence our
proof of the completeness of Int. What remains to verify for the official completion of our proof of Theorem 2.6 is
that ? is of complexity Σ B1 . Such a verification is given in the following subsection.
7 As noted for Ď in Section 9.3, how ? interprets the atoms that are not in (32) is irrelevant and not worth bothering at this point.
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9.7. The complexity of the counterinterpretation
The counterinterpretation ? constructed in the previous subsection interprets each atom A˙(x) of (32) as the binary
predicate A¨(x, z). With “true in the sense of Section 9.4 (resp. 9.5)” below understood as truth in the sense of the
corresponding subsection where Bc is taken in the role of B (and, accordingly, Γc in the role of Γ ) when constructing
the counterinterpretation Ď from it, the meaning of the proposition A¨(a, c) for any given constants a, c is in fact the
disjunction of the following two statements:
1. “Bc is short and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Section 9.4”;
2. “Bc is long and A˙(a) is true in the sense of Section 9.5”.
Note that arbitrarily long initial segments of Bc can be effectively constructed from c. This can be done by first
constructing the machine Hc from number c, and then tracing, step by step, how the play between Hc and E evolves
on valuation ec according to the scenario described in the proof idea for Lemma 5.1. This makes it clear that the
predicate “Bc is long” (with c here treated as a variable) is of complexity Σ1, because it says nothing but that there is
a computation step in Bc at which bW˘c gets matchingly grounded.
Next, “Bc is short” is just the negation of “Bc is long”.
Next, some thought can show “ A˙(a) is true in the sense of Section 9.4” (with a, together with the hidden c, here
treated as a variable) to mean nothing but that there is no computation step in Bc at which A˙(a) becomes the content
of some positive non-matchingly grounded residual molecule of the then-current position. So this is the negation of a
Σ1-predicate.
Finally, “ A˙(a) is true in the sense of Section 9.5” means that there is a — lexicographically smallest — open chain
C hitting bW˘c, and A˙(a) is not the content of anything in C . With a little thought we can see that, to find such a chain
C , it would be sufficient to trace Bc only up to the computation step at which bW˘c gets grounded. So, the complexity
of the predicate “ A˙(a) is true in the sense of Section 9.5” is Σ1.
To summarize, where A˙(x) is an atom of (32), A¨(x, z), i.e. A˙?(x), is indeed a Boolean combination of Σ1-
predicates. As for all other elementary atoms, we may make arbitrary assumptions — without affecting the
incomputability of (32)? — about how they are interpreted by ?. So, we assume that they, too, are interpreted as
Boolean combinations of Σ1-predicates.
10. Finishing the completeness proof for intuitionistic logic
Suppose K is an Int-formula with Int 6` K . Let F be the dedollarization of K . According to Lemma 6.2, Int 6` F .
Let G ⇒ W be the standardization of F . By Lemma 7.4, Int 6` G ⇒ W . Hence, by the completeness of Int with
respect to Kripke semantics, there is a model K with K /||≡ G ⇒ W . Obviously here we may assume that K ||≡ G and
K /||≡W . Let n be the size of K. Then, by Lemma 9.1, there is an interpretation ◦ of complexityunionsqΣ B1 such that 6|H D◦,
where D is the n-desequentization of G ⇒ W . But then, by Lemma 8.1, 6|H F◦. But then, by Lemma 6.3, there is
an interpretation ∗ of the same complexity unionsqΣ B1 such that 6|H K ∗. This proves the completeness of Int in the strong
sense of clause (b) of Theorem 2.6, and here our story ends.
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